

ATTITUDES TOWARDS ISRAEL & ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS:
THE RELATIONSHIP*

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Negative feelings towards Israel do not coincide with negative feelings towards Jews, according to the evidence. And yet there is evidence that negative attitudes towards the State of Israel may constitute a major new watershed of international anti-semitism.

Because of the importance of Israel to Jews everywhere -- and because the creation of Israel was partly a response to the Nazi Holocaust -- there has been a tendency to equate hostility towards Israel with anti-semitism. Of course, "hostility towards Israel," like anti-semitism itself, is a mixed bag whose contents need separating. But, on the face of it, the automatic connection is not there.

In September of 1974, for example, the Yankelovich poll asked Americans whether they thought it would be good or bad to have a Jew as President; and whether they would identify with Israel or the Arabs in case another war broke out. The same proportion of those who approved of a Jewish president as of those who disapproved of a Jewish president identified positively with Israel. And the same proportion of those who approved as disapproved of a Jewish president, identified positively with the Arabs. (1)

In their analysis of a comprehensive 1974 Louis Harris survey, Lipset and Schneider found no significant correlation, one way or another, between sympathy for Israel and conventional anti-semitism. Nor was there a significant correlation between anti-semitism and support of the PLO; nor between the belief that Jews have too much power in this country and support of Israel. (2)

The question of "Jewish power" is of particular interest, especially as related to the perception of how American Jews use that "power" on behalf of Israel. There has long been concern about the large proportion of Americans who consistently say that the American Jews feel closer to or more loyal to Israel than to the U.S. That, of course, raises the spectre of "dual loyalty," which has always been a staple of hard-core anti-semitism.

In earlier years the "disloyalty" question was usually a pure function of anti-semitism, the point of reference being the lack of Jewish loyalty to anyone other than the Jewish clan itself. Modern right-wing anti-semites then attempted to establish a link between that disloyalty and radicalism or Communism. Thus, in various surveys from 1938 to 1940, anywhere from a quarter to a third of all Americans believed that Jews were "less patriotic than other citizens." (3) In one 1940 study, about one fifth of all Americans believed that Jews tended to be communistic or radical; Jews were at the top of that list, just below Russians. (3)

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After World War II, there was a severe drop in the proportion of Americans who thought of Jews as more radical or Communistic than other Americans. (4) However, since the State of Israel, anywhere from one quarter to a third of Americans have agreed with the proposition that Jews are more loyal or closer to Israel than to America. (5)

That is about the same proportion of Americans who thought the Jews were disloyal in the 1930s, usually in connection with some kind of radicalism. But there is a drastic difference between the two phenomena. In the 1930s the suspicions about Jewish loyalty were directly associated with anti-semitism. Today, that does not seem to be the case.

There is an obvious explanation for this disparity, and for the current correlation between anti-semitism and belief about Jewish loyalty to Israel. Americans overwhelmingly disapproved of radicalism and Communism in the 1930s, and any perception of Jewish involvement with radicalism could serve either as a cause of anti-semitism or just as a convenient article of anti-semitic belief. But Americans have overwhelmingly approved of Israel, as we shall see, so Jewish activity on behalf of Israel has been considered generally benign.

In November 1956 only 12 percent of Americans thought American Jews had complicity in "the trouble in the Middle East," and only half of those thought that there was anything wrong with such an involvement. (6) In October 1974 Yankelovich found that about one out of ten Americans thought that the close ties of American Jews to Israel was bad; about 3 out of 10 thought the close ties were positively good, while the rest were indifferent. Even more significantly, the ratios were about the same for all other ethnic groups mentioned. Americans felt a little more favorable about Irish ties to Ireland than about Jewish ties to Israel; and a little less favorable about the national ties of Greeks, Blacks, Germans and Spanish-speaking people than they did about the Jewish ties to Israel.

Such findings are obviously governed by the circumstances. Americans did not have benign thoughts about such close national ties when they applied to the Germans in World War I, the Japanese-Americans in World War II, or the Iranian-Americans during the hostage crisis. The point is that the circumstances in America have been favorable towards Israel. Therefore, the perceived connections between American Jews and Israel have not triggered a backlash.

There is reason to believe that many Americans do have some resentment about a Jewish political power used on behalf of Israel which so many of them are willing to term "too much;" or with the concept that Jews have "more loyalty" to Israel than to the United States. However, even that portion of the American public is not pushed into active hostility towards American Jews on that account, as long as those Americans themselves so prevalently sympathize with Israel.

Therefore, a paramount factor to be considered is the stability of those sympathies, of the favorable circumstances of American/Israeli relations.

There are three axes around which sympathy or antagonism for Israel can turn; and each of them has a different implication for anti-semitism. One is nationalist Zionism and nationalist anti-Zionism. The second is political anti-Zionism, which finally has more to do with Jews than with the Israel it invokes. And the third axis turns more pragmatically around perceived mutuality or antipathy of interests.

Nationalist Zionism and Anti-Zionism

The definition of Zionism has a vast body of literature and a long history of debate among Jews. One of the subjects of that debate has had to do with the manner in which Zionism does or does not relate to the Land of Israel. But, within the limited context of Zionism/anti-Zionism and anti-semitism, a core definition of nationalist Zionism can be posited which holds that the State of Israel belongs where it is, that it exists for Jews everywhere and that it must be a Jewish state.

This definition of nationalist Zionism has an ideological cast beyond simple patriotism and nationalism -- although many Israelis embrace the premises of core Zionism for security reasons if for nothing else. For example, it is not likely that many Israeli Jews would feel secure in any Middle East government which was not Jewish, on pragmatic grounds alone. For a mixture of ideological and security reasons, there are a number of non-Israelis who would embrace the principles of core nationalist Zionism, including some Christian fundamentalists, and most diaspora Jews.

The Arab world is, of course, the source of nationalist anti-Zionism. To begin with, there is a clash of Israeli and Arab nationalisms not unlike other nationalist clashes which have taken place in the world's history, although among the most inconsolable. David Ben Gurion stated it simply to the Zionist Action Committee in 1938: "[The Arabs] do not acknowledge our right to a homeland because, in their eyes, this is their homeland." (7)

And that nationalist clash, whenever it became aggravated, inevitably brought with it mutual hostilities and prejudices between the peoples involved. In 1912, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, chief rabbi of Palestine, objected to an emerging "mentality of hatred for the Arabs" which appeared in a Jewish journal in Palestine. (8)

Despite the resistance of many Israelis and Arabs, the nationalist conflict engendered prejudicial anti-Arab and anti-Jewish feelings. Under much less desperate conditions, America's wars with Germany and Japan resulted in similar tendencies within our own country. The historian of the Arab nationalist movement, George Antonius, wrote in 1938: "The development of Zionism in the post-war [World War I] period has been one of the main psychological factors in the deplorable growth of anti-semitism." (9) Antonius knew that the term "anti-semitism" had been created to apply specifically to the Jews. He also knew that "Zionism" was the proper name of Jewish nationalism in the Middle East, and a source of anti-Jewish feeling among Arabs.

The "anti-semitism" and "anti-Arabism" engendered by this nationalist Zionism and anti-Zionism would, under other circumstances, not deserve wide attention or have reverberations on the world scene. But this regional antagonism is being acted out on the world scene. Indeed, the clashing Arab/Israeli nationalisms often seem the smallest part of the conflict raging in that area. As one result, this nationalist anti-Zionism has been attached to, used to fuel, and often confused with another quite different kind of "anti-Zionism," which might be called political anti-Zionism.

Political Anti-Zionism

There is a symmetry between nationalist Zionism and nationalist anti-Zionism, the latter being directly addressed to the core attributes of modern Zionism. But there is no such symmetry to political anti-Zionism, whose source of antagonism is not Zionism, but the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The logic of political anti-Zionism is built around the classic conspiracy theory featuring a cabalistic Jewish world power on the world scene. Plagiaristic Czarist agents brought that theory to an art form in the creation of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Hitler used the theory and the Protocols, and occasionally the term "Zionism" in his war against the Jews.

Of course, one recognizes political anti-Zionism, so described, as a near-euphemism for political anti-semitism. But political anti-Zionism has an identity of its own: political anti-semitism which uses Israel as a key ingredient in its image of a cabalistic Jewish world power.

The chief sources of this political anti-Zionism are the Soviet Union, anti-American "third world" ideologues and Arab propagandists, in that order. Political anti-Zionism is the form in which political anti-semitism is used by the "left wing" as it is generally perceived.

Political anti-semitism on the left was foreshadowed not so much by its anti-nationalism as by its taste for a statism bereft of mediating groups. The first watershed of modern anti-semitism, it has been noted, was the kind of non-pluralistic European nationalism which ironically was associated with the liberation of the Jews from the ghetto. That was the import of Clermont-Tonnere's famous statement demanding individual and religious liberty for the Jews, but also demanding of the Jews that they become "Frenchmen" and not constitute themselves as a separate community. It was, of course, a tragic flaw of European nationalist liberalism, which became a fearful right-wing instrument.

But another watershed of modern anti-semitism was prefigured when Lenin outlawed anti-semitism in the Soviet Union at the same time that he began to disband Jewish community organizations. This ideological antipathy to Jewish life was less redolent of Clermont-Tonnere than of his contemporary, Jean Jacques Rousseau, who insisted that nothing should intervene between the individual and the benign state.

But compounded of whatever historical tendencies, political anti-Zionism, like old-fashioned political anti-semitism, is a largely fictional device which is mainly used as an instrument in the retention or acquisition of political power. The Soviet Union, the prime ideological source of

political anti-Zionism, has uses for that instrument on both the domestic and the world political scene. The ideology, simple enough, is repeated day after day in the official press and literature of the USSR. There is little deviation from the formula, as expressed by Lev Korneev in 1982:

"An important role in the psychological war of imperialism is allotted to Zionism whose ultimate goal in political practice is the achievement of maximum dominance for the Jewish bourgeoisie in the system of capitalism and the liquidation of the countries of socialism. With the support of all the other forces of world reaction, the subversive activity of Zionism has now acquired very impressive dimensions. On account of this, a correct analysis of complicated world problems and important international events will hardly be possible if the degree of participation in them of Zionism is not taken into account."

Korneev continues in the formula to clearly identify Zionism with the "fascist" state of Israel, and proceeds to delegitimize both Israel and the Jews. He says that Israel calls together "people who live in more than a hundred countries, and who are in no way connected with each other ... The Jews ceased being a people, they lost their common language, and the Jewish ruling clique was turned, in the course of centuries, into a special type of intermediary cosmopolitan group in which rabbis, merchants, usurers and other such exploiters dominated ... Centuries long practice over the whole earth allowed Jewish merchants, usurers and bankers to concentrate in their hands incalculable wealth; it is not for nothing that the name Rothschild became the synonym for the man of unlimited wealth."

The more naked words, "Jewish" and "Jewry," begin to appear on their own, as the linkages are established in this conspiracy theory:

"The position of Jewish capital is very significant in France, England, Sweden, Australia, Holland and several other countries. At the same time, the Jewish bourgeoisie is American, English, French and so on, that is, part of the plutocracy of the country in which it resides. Thus, Jewry has a double character, which is expressed in its ideology and political character." (10)

This is the package of political anti-Zionism as it is produced, used internally and exported by the Soviet Union. It is, in fact, old-fashioned political anti-semitism with the added ingredient of Israel. However, Israel is not the prime target of political anti-Zionism, as it is in nationalist anti-Zionism. As Yuri Ivanov, a leading Soviet theorist on Jewish matters, has put it:

"Zionism is the ideology, the complex system of organizations and the political practice of the big Jewish bourgeoisie which has merged with the monopolistic circles of the United States and other imperialistic powers ... The ruling circles of Israel entered the international Jewish concern as junior partners." (11)

While Israel is not the chief target of political anti-Zionism, the existence of Israel provides this new version of political anti-semitism with a seeming credibility it would not otherwise have, especially for the "left wing," and provides a link in the conspiracy web which serves the ideological purposes of "third world" anti-American rhetoric around the world, even when it is not strikingly pro-Soviet.

It is, after all, a matter of fact that Israel and the United States are close allies. It is a matter of fact that Jews around the world support Israel politically and financially. These facts are a cause of embitterment for Arab nationalists; and they are carefully noted by "third world" ideologues who have taken up the cause of Arab nationalism and who typically describe Israel as a "handmaiden of American imperialism."

Jordan's representative at the UN, Hazem Nuseibeh, spoke at the UN debate on December 15, 1980, in this fashion:

"The representative of the Zionist entity is evidently incapable of concealing his deep-seated hatred towards the Arab world for having broke loose from the notorious exploitation of its natural resources, long held in bondage and plundered by his own people's cabal, which controls and manipulates the rest of humanity by controlling the money and wealth of the world."
(12)

Just as the links between "international Zionism, the U.S. and imperialism" are constantly made part of the weave of conspiracy theory by some Arab spokesmen, so have they become useful for the non-Arab ideologues of "third-world" anti-Americanism. A characteristic article entitled "The Class Origins of Zionist Ideology," by a professor at Tuskegee Institute, stated: "It was somewhat symbolic that the original draft of [Herzl's] The Jewish State was entitled An Address to the Rothschilds and intended for the private use of the Rothschild family ... That Zionism expressed the interests of Jewish finance capital did not negate the fact that Zionism also was an ideology of world imperialism." (13)

Similar expressions have been found all over that ideological landscape. In one of its periods, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) published a cartoon depicting a hand with the Star of David and a dollar sign on it pulling nooses around the necks of Nasser and Muhammad Ali; and asked the readers whether they knew "that the famous European Jews, the Rothschilds, who have long controlled the wealth of many European nations, were involved in the original conspiracy with the British to create the 'State of Israel' ...?" (14)

It is not that all Arab nationalists or "third world" anti-Americanists embrace political anti-Zionism. However, it is important to note that the currency of political anti-Zionism, as distinct from nationalist anti-Zionism, is a grave potential source of political anti-semitism in the world today.

Attitudes Based on American/Israeli Relations

It is also important to note that sentiments about Israel and about the Jews in the United States do not primarily turn around either the axis of nationalist anti-Zionism, or of political anti-Zionism. The attitudes of most Americans about Israel are primarily shaped by pragmatic considerations of "American national interest."

It is a common misperception that Americans were most sympathetic to Israel at the time of its creation, following hard on the American war against Nazism and the revelation of the Holocaust. Distance from that period, according to that misperception, has eroded American sympathy.

But overall American sympathy for Israel has increased with the years. Thus, six surveys of American sympathy between the years 1947 and 1949 show a median of 33 per cent of Americans favoring the Israelis and 12 per cent favoring the Arabs. A review of 15 surveys between 1970 and 1983 shows a median of 47 per cent of Americans favoring the Israelis and 7 per cent favoring the Arabs. (15)

It may be that the 24 per cent of Americans who said they were more sympathetic to the Israelis in November of 1947 were a somewhat more solid and less changeable bloc than the 49 per cent who said they were more sympathetic to the Israelis in February 1983. (At both times, 12 per cent said they were more sympathetic to the Arabs.) After all, this growing American proclivity to "sympathize" with the Israeli cause carries with it a limited commitment. We know, for example, that the American public which sympathizes with Israel will typically retreat when asked whether we should be militarily involved on Israel's behalf, even to the extent of selling arms. But, while the American public's willingness to send arms to Israel has varied more than the "sympathy" quotient in the face of differing circumstances, that index of support has also generally risen over the years.

There have been a number of signals that the American public's attitudes towards Israel, from the beginning, have been shaped by strategic considerations, as signalled by the American government. In November 1947, when the U.S. government had announced its approval of a UN partition plan which would include Israel, 65 per cent of the American public said they approved. But in April of 1948, when the U.S. government announced that it opposed that same plan, only 26 per cent of the American public said it approved such a plan. (16)

In 1968, when one representative American sample was asked whether they were willing for the U.S. to send arms to Israel, only about a quarter replied in the affirmative; but when the same sample, at the same time, was asked whether they would be willing to send arms to Israel "if the Soviets were arming the Arabs," the affirmative answer more than doubled. And American public support has remained stable in its support of Israel, despite its disagreements with specific Israeli actions and moral postures. Thus, a Gallup release of July 1982 reported:

"Although as many American disapprove as approve of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the action appears not to have altered Americans' basic loyalties in the Middle East ... In an analagous situation last summer, a Newsweek poll conducted by the Gallup organization found that America's reaction to Israel's bombing of PLO positions in Beirut was more critical. Fifty per cent said the bombing was not justified and 31 per cent said that it was. But that survey, too, found no change in Americans' basic sympathies."

There is much evidence on that score. In a July 1981 Yankelevich poll, Americans were virtually split on such questions as whether Israel was wrong in its attitudes towards a Palestinian state on the West Bank, or whether Israel treated Arabs badly, but these same Americans still registered their sympathy for the Israelis over the Arabs by a five to one ratio.

In sum, these cues suggest that American support for Israel has less to do with any intrinsic emotional ties to that country, or with Zionist ideologies, than with perceptions of American national interest.

The term "national interest" is a commodious one. It is not just a matter of rarefied geopolitics or military strategy, although Israel is prevalently seen as the only politically stable and militarily viable ally of the U.S. in that area. That perception has to do with American national security, and with the inhibition of Soviet expansion in the area; but it also has to do with access to oil, the American economy and American jobs. It also has to do with peace, another popular aspect of perceived American national interest.

Also, the perception of Israel as a free, western-style, democratic society -- the only one in the Middle East -- not only affects Israel's ability to complement those other American goals in the Middle East -- but also stands on its own. Israel's political and public culture is familiar and qualifies Israel as part of that circle of wagons known as the association of free societies, patently important for America. American sympathy for Israel is prevalently based on some combination of these perceived elements of American national interest, rather than on sentiments related to the Holocaust or to core Zionism.

This prevalently favorable American attitude towards Israel serves as a natural deterrent against negative attitudes about Jews spilling over to negative attitudes about Israel, especially among those who have some strong sense of investment in the "American national interest." That would include the great majority of Americans, and notably that segment of the population which has been prone to conventional anti-semitism in the past. The ideology of the rampant right-wing anti-semitism of the 1920s and 1930s centered on the Americanism and anti-Communism which now calls for support of Israel.

A reversal of this prevalently favorable attitude towards Israel would not necessarily create, in itself, a wave of anti-semitism in America. But the deterrent would no longer be there; and there would be the added phenomenon of American Jewry promoting an Israel seen as antipathetic to America.

In Summary and Foreboding

With respect to the relationship between attitudes towards Israel and attitudes towards Jews, the evidence adduced leads to some hard conclusions about today's situation; but can only provide some softer suggestions about the possible permutations of tomorrow. Jews tend to have a "sense of foreboding" which can be pushed over into paranoia, but more often is a fairly sensible concern about the evil potential in currently satisfactory but volatile situations. (17)

Anti-semitism is not today a serious source of anti-Israel feeling. That is primarily because, within perceptions of the American/Israeli alliance, conventional anti-semitism tends to be tied to values which would lead to support of Israel, or at least deter antagonism to Israel.

But, despite the evidence that within large statistical groupings, there does not seem to be a significant relationship between anti-semitism and anti-Israel feelings, it would be contrary to good sense to believe that hard-core anti-semites find it easy to be partial to a Jewish state. And indeed there is evidence that there is a relatively small pocket of population in which there is a relationship between the two attitudes. In one 1981 survey, it was found that 23 per cent of the population was counted "anti-semitic" because they held so many negative beliefs about Jews. Almost the same proportion, 20 per cent of the population which was "highly favorable to Israel," were among those counted as "anti-semitic." But among those "unfavorable to Israel," 32 per cent were anti-semitic.

There is undoubtedly a hard core of anti-semites in America whose negative attitudes extend to the Jewish state. But it is a small hard core which does not yet seriously affect the general climate of American favorableness towards Israel.

Anti-Israel feeling is not today a serious source of anti-semitism. This converse disconnection is an even more direct result of the prevalent climate of partiality towards Israel. It is not possible to now disentangle the primacy of anti-semitism or of anti-Israelism in the hard core which is both anti-semitic and anti-Israel. But because of the prevailing circumstances with respect to American/Israeli relations, that hard core is not a major factor today in this country. And for the great bulk of the American population, there is today no significant connection between negative feelings towards Israel and negative feelings towards Jews.

Parenthetically, the same evidence on that score suggests that neither is there a significant direct connection between positive feelings towards Israel and positive feelings towards Jews. Indeed, in that 1981 survey, only 6 per cent of the population said that the existence of Israel made them think more highly of Jews, and a slightly smaller percentage said that Israel's existence made them think less highly of Jews. But whatever the significance of such a subjective self-analysis, certain indirect effects cannot be cavalierly discounted.

There has been some evidence in the past, for example, that Americans who know Jews best, in a friendly context, tend to be more sympathetic to Israel. To paraphrase a Hadley Cantril premise about public opinion: when attitudes are not highly structured, they tend to move in the direction of attitudes held strongly by friends and associates. But even more indirectly but more powerfully: the image of the American Jew as familiarly integrated into the American culture can presumably buttress the image of Israel as a western democratic society, one component of perceived American national interest in Israel. When a Cambridge Survey asked Americans to compare Israelis and Arabs on a number of cultural characteristics, the item on which the Americans rated Israelis most favorably had to do with which group was "most like Americans." On that item, Israelis were favored by a five to one ratio. (18)

There are undoubtedly such indirect effects. But they do not disturb the present evidence that anti-semitism and anti-Israel feeling are not to be equated, and that neither is the prime source for the other in contemporary America.

The Foreboding Syndrome: The favorable American climate towards Israel is reversible. Prevalent negative attitudes towards Israel would not only remove a deterrent, but would be likely to provide a stimulant to anti-semitism, presumably built around American Jewish activity on behalf of an unpopular Israel.

The foundation is there in the fact that one quarter to more than a third of Americans have been consistently willing to say that American Jews are more loyal to or closer to Israel than to America. The Cambridge Survey twice, in 1974 and 1975, put the question at its most abrasive: "Some people forget they are Americans when they rush to defend Israel." In both cases, a third of the Americans responded in the affirmative. (19)

It is noteworthy that the one apparently sharp break in the continuing favorable Gallup poll measurements of American attitudes towards Israel came in September 1982. As noted above, Gallup had pointed out in July of that year that basic American support of Israel over the Arabs had remained steady, in the face of a number of Israeli actions of which the American public disapproved, and in the face of Israel's incursion into Lebanon. But in September 1982, the ratio of approval for Israel over the Arabs, which had been 49-10 in July 1981, dipped to 32-28. This followed a series of highly publicized rows between the governments of the U.S. and Israel, culminating in President Reagan's proposal for the future of the West Bank, which the Israeli government rejected abruptly and with an unusually strong personal attack on the President.

Israel's importance for "American national interest" had been impugned. The ratio of approval for Israel over the Arabs snapped back quickly in the Gallup survey of January 1983 to a ratio of 49-12, as the air cleared between the two nations.

However, the episode provides support for the premise that circumstances touching on perceptions of American national interest will largely determine American commitment to Israel. And there also emerges an understandable uneasiness about the deterioration of goodwill towards American Jews under those circumstances.

Furthermore, one should not be too limited in identifying the kinds of changing circumstances that might be involved. It is conceivable but not too likely that American policy-makers will "abandon" Israel in the foreseeable future; the logic and tradition of that alliance is strong. But it is even more conceivable that America's general circumstances at some given point could limit America's ability to support Israel. There are strong veins of American sentiment which are isolationist, anti-military or at least opposed to active American military involvement abroad.

If America's support of Israel were to waver on this account, or indeed on the additional account of domestic economic stress, American Jewish activity on behalf of restoring that support would predictably become even more vocal -- and it is likely that such activity would be seen as contrary to American national interest. The resentment which has been muted could be activated.

The formulations here are functionally tied to the question of American anti-semitism. The same equations are not applicable to France and the fourth largest Jewish community in the world. "French national interest" is differently perceived. Currents of pro-Arab, anti-American thought are, of course, much stronger. Susceptibility to left-wing political anti-Zionism is greater. However, many observers are similarly convinced that the future of anti-semitism in France is tied to Middle East politics. As Henry Weinberg put it:

"The renewed attacks on Jews during the recent Israeli action in Lebanon suggest that the potential for anti-Jewish violence in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict may become a permanent feature of life in France. In the end, the place of the Jew in French society will to a large extent be determined in a region distant from France's boundaries. As a senior French Jewish statesman phrased it in response to a question about the future of French Jewry: 'Everything depends on events in the Middle East.'" (20)

Since the 1930s, no one has been foolish enough to say "it can't happen here." The possibility of the emergence of political anti-semitism in America must always be kept open. But, in the modern world, political anti-semitism means political anti-Zionism. Israel cannot be left out of the equation. As long as the American/Israeli alliance is convincing, and made convincing by American policy-makers, right-wing political anti-Zionism is less likely in America.

Nor is the ascendancy of left-wing political anti-Zionism any more likely in America's foreseeable future than the ascendancy of any left-wing political ideology. Less unlikely is that certain American streams of isolationist, anti-military and anti-American thought can hasten the deterioration of American support of Israel under certain circumstances, with negative results for American Jews.

In any case, the signals suggest that anti-semitism is not and probably will not be at the genesis of any widespread antagonism towards Israel -- but that any political anti-semitism in our future will find its basis in antagonism towards Israel -- and more precisely, in the activity of Jews supporting an Israel towards which there has developed antagonism or apathy.

NOTES

- 1) The hazards of survey information, especially in the face of different language and different time situations, is well known. However, in the case of the Middle East, the same questions have been asked so often by the same organizations over the course of so many different time situations, that a comparison of the results is often useful. In other cases, survey material is no more than, but no less than, suggestive.

In most cases, where such material is used, the date and source are listed in the text and not footnoted. For some other material, references are made to two compilations of survey results: Charles Herbert Stember and others, Jews in the Minds of Men, New York, Basic Books, 1966; and Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, American Opinion Towards Israel and Jew, unpublished Mss.

2) Correlations:

Conventional Anti-Semitism and Sympathy for Israel	(-.07)
Conventional Anti-Semitism and Perception of Jewish Power	(-.04)
Conventional Anti-Semitism and Support of the PLO	(-.09)

- 3) Stember, op. cit., pp. 116 and 158.

- 4) Ibid., p. 162.

5) Jews More Loyal to Israel Than to America

<u>Year</u>	<u>Agree (%)</u>	<u>Source</u>
1964	30	NORC
1974	26	NORC
1974	26	Harris
1974	34	Yankelovich
1977	27	Yankelovich
1979	29	Gallup
1980	34	Gallup
1981	34	Gallup
1982 (March)	30	Gallup
1983 (Jan.)	37	Gallup

- 6) Stember, op. cit., p. 189.

- 7) Quoted in Elyakim Rubenstein, "Zionist Attitudes in the Arab-Jewish Dispute to 1936," Jerusalem Quarterly, Winter 1982, p. 140.

- 8) Quoted in Ben Zion Bokser, "Rabbi Kook, the Arabs and the Japanese," Judaism, Spring 1983, p. 185.

- 9) George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, New York, Capricorn Books Edition, p. 265.

- 10) Lev Korneev, "For Whom Is This Profitable? The Psychological War of International Zionism," Neva, May 1982.

- 11) Yuri Ivanov, Advisor on Jewish Affairs to the CPSU Central Committee, Beware Zionism.

- 12) Institute of Jewish Affairs, Research Report, December 1981, p. 10.

- 13) Stephen Halbrook, Journal of Palestinian Studies, Autumn 1972, pp. 87, 106.

- 14) SNCC Newsletter, June-July 1967.

15)

<u>Date</u>	<u>More Sympathy for</u>		<u>Source</u>
	<u>Israelis (%)</u>	<u>Arabs (%)</u>	
Nov. 1947	24	12	Stember (p. 179)
Feb. 1948	35	16	"
June 1948	34	12	"
July 1948	36	14	"
Oct. 1948	33	11	"
March 1949	32	13	"

Feb. 1969	43	4	Gallup
Feb. 1970	38	2	Gallup
Aug. 1970	47	6	Harris
July 1971	46	7	Harris
Oct. 1973	47	6	Gallup
Nov. 1973	48	7	Roper
Dec. 1973	41	6	Roper
Dec. 1973	50	7	Gallup
Jan. 1976	56	9	Yankelovich
Jan. 1977	47	6	Gallup
June 1977	43	5	Gallup
Oct. 1980	45	13	Gallup
July 1981	49	10	Yankelovich
Sep. 1982	32	28	Gallup
Jan. 1983	49	12	Gallup

Midstream, February 1983.

- 16) Stember, op. cit., p. 178.
- 17) Earl Raab, "Anti-Semitism in the 1980s," Midstream, February 1983.
- 18) Lipset & Schneider, op. cit., p. 17.
- 19) Ibid., p. 53.
- 20) Henry H. Weinberg, "French Jewry: Trauma and Renewal," Midstream, December 1982.