

# Attitudes Toward Israel and Attitudes Toward Jews: The Relationship

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Negative feelings toward Israel do not coincide with negative feelings toward Jews, according to the evidence. And yet there is evidence that negative attitudes toward the State of Israel may constitute a major new watershed of international antisemitism. Because of the importance of Israel to Jews everywhere—and because the creation of Israel was partly a response to the Nazi Holocaust—there has been a tendency to equate hostility toward Israel with antisemitism. Of course, “hostility toward Israel,” like antisemitism itself, is a mixed bag whose contents need separating. But on the face of it, the automatic connection is not there.

In the Yankelovich poll of September 1974, for example, Americans were asked whether they thought it would be good or bad to have a Jew as president, *and* whether they would identify with the Israelis or the Arabs in case another war broke out. The same proportion of those who approved of a Jewish president as of those who disapproved of a Jewish president identified positively with the Israelis. And the same proportions of those who approved and disapproved of a Jewish president identified positively with the Arabs.<sup>1</sup> In their analysis of a comprehensive 1974 Louis Harris survey, Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider found no significant correlation one way or another between sympathy for Israel and conventional antisemitism. Nor was there a significant correlation between antisemitism and support for the PLO or between the belief that Jews have too much power in this country and support for Israel.<sup>2</sup>

The question of “Jewish power” is of particular interest, especially as it relates to the perception of how American Jews use that “power” on behalf of Israel. There has long been concern about the large proportion of Americans who consistently say that the American Jews feel closer to or more loyal to Israel than to the United States. That, of course, raises the spectre of “dual loyalty,” which has always been a staple of hard-core antisemitism.

In earlier years the “disloyalty” question was usually a pure function of antisemitism, the point of reference being the lack of Jewish loyalty to anything other than the Jewish clan itself. Modern right-wing antisemites then attempted to establish a link between that disloyalty and radicalism or communism. Thus, in various surveys from 1938 to 1940, anywhere from a quarter to a third of all Americans believed that Jews were “less patriotic than other citizens.” In one 1940 study, about one-fifth of all Americans believed that Jews tended to be communistic or radical; Jews were at the top of that list, just below Russians.<sup>3</sup> After World War II, there was a severe drop in the proportion of Americans who thought of Jews as more radical or communistic than other Americans.<sup>4</sup>

However, since the establishment of the State of Israel, anywhere from a quarter to a third of Americans have agreed with the proposition that Jews are more loyal or closer to Israel than to the United States.<sup>5</sup> That is about the same proportion of Americans who thought the Jews were disloyal in the 1930s, usually in connection with some kind of radicalism. But there is a drastic difference between the two phenomena. In the 1930s the suspicions about Jewish loyalty were directly associated with antisemitism. Today, that does not seem to be the case.

There is an obvious explanation for this disparity and for the current correlation between antisemitism and belief about Jewish loyalty to Israel. Americans overwhelmingly disapproved of radicalism and communism in the 1930s, and any perception of Jewish involvement with radicalism could serve either as a cause of antisemitism or just as a convenient article of antisemitic belief. But Americans have overwhelmingly approved of Israel, as we shall see, so Jewish activity on behalf of Israel has been considered generally benign.

In November 1956, only 12 percent of Americans thought American Jews had complicity in “the trouble in the Middle East,” and only half of those thought that there was anything wrong with such an involvement.<sup>6</sup> In October 1974, Yankelovich found that about one out of ten Americans thought that the close ties of American Jews to Israel was bad, about three out of ten thought the close ties were positive, and the rest were indifferent. Even more significant, the ratios were about the same for all other ethnic groups mentioned. Americans felt a little more favorable about Irish ties to Ireland than about Jewish ties to Israel and a little less favorable about the national ties of Greeks, Blacks, Germans, and Spanish-speaking people than they did about Jewish ties to Israel.

Such findings are obviously governed by the circumstances. Americans did not have benign thoughts about such close national ties when they applied to the German Americans in World War I, Japanese Americans in World War II, or Iranian Americans during the hostage crisis. The point is that circumstances in the United States have been favorable to Israel. Therefore, the perceived connections between American Jews and Israel have not triggered a backlash.

There is reason to believe that many Americans *do* have some resentment about a Jewish political power used on behalf of Israel (a power that so many of them are willing to term “too much”) and about the concept that Jews have “more loyalty” to Israel than to the United States. However, even that portion of the American public is not pushed into active hostility toward American Jews on this account, as long as those Americans themselves so predominantly sympathize with Israel. Therefore, a paramount factor to be considered is the stability of those sympathies and of the favorable circumstances of U.S.-Israeli relations. There are three axes around which sympathy or antagonism for Israel can turn, and each of them has a different implication for antisemitism. One is nationalist Zionism and nationalist anti-Zionism. The second is political anti-Zionism, which has more to do with Jews than with the Israel it invokes. The third axis turns more pragmatically around perceived mutuality or antipathy of interests.

## Nation and Zionism and Anti-Zionism

The definition of Zionism is associated with a vast body of literature and a long history of debate among Jews. One of the subjects of that debate has had to do with the manner in which Zionism does or does not relate to the Land of Israel. But within the limited context of Zionism/anti-Zionism and antisemitism, it is possible to posit a core definition of nationalist Zionism which holds that the State of Israel belongs where it is, that it exists for Jews everywhere, and that it must be a Jewish state. This definition of nationalist Zionism has an ideological cast beyond simple patriotism and nationalism—although many Israelis embrace the premises of core Zionism for security reasons, if for no other reason. For example, it is not likely that, on pragmatic grounds alone, many Israeli Jews would feel secure in any Middle East government that was not Jewish. For a mixture of ideological and security reasons, there are a number of non-Israelis who would embrace the principles of core nationalist Zionism, including some Christian fundamentalists and most Diaspora Jews.

The Arab world is, of course, the source of nationalist anti-Zionism. To begin with, there is a clash of Israeli and Arab nationalisms that, although similar to other nationalist clashes that have taken place in the world's history, are among the most intractable. David Ben Gurion stated it simply to the Zionist Action Committee in 1938: "[The Arabs] do not acknowledge our right to a homeland because, in their eyes, this is their homeland."<sup>7</sup> Moreover, this nationalist clash, whenever it became aggravated, inevitably brought with it mutual hostilities and prejudices between the peoples involved. In 1912, Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, chief rabbi of Palestine, objected in a Jewish journal in Palestine to an emerging "mentality of hatred for the Arabs."<sup>8</sup>

Despite the resistance of many Israelis and Arabs, the nationalist conflict engendered prejudicial anti-Arab and anti-Jewish feelings. Under much less desperate conditions, the United States' wars with Germany and Japan resulted in similar tendencies within the United States. The historian of the Arab nationalist movement, George Antonius, wrote in 1938: "The development of Zionism in the post-war [World War I] period has been one of the main psychological factors in the deplorable growth of antisemitism."<sup>9</sup> Antonius knew that the term *antisemitism* had been created to apply specifically to the Jews. He also knew that *Zionism* was the proper name for Jewish nationalism in the Middle East, as well as source of anti-Jewish feeling among Arabs.

The antisemitism and anti-Arabism engendered by this nationalistic Zionism and anti-Zionism would not, under other circumstances, deserve wide attention or have reverberations on the world scene. But this regional antagonism is being acted out on the world scene. Indeed, the clashing Arab/Israeli nationalisms often seem the smallest part of the conflict raging in that area. As one result, the nationalist anti-Zionism has been attached to, used to fuel, and often confused with another quite different kind of anti-Zionism, one that might be called political anti-Zionism.

## Political Anti-Zionism

There is a symmetry between nationalist Zionism and nationalist anti-Zionism, the latter being directly addressed to the core attributes of modern Zionism. But there is no such symmetry with political anti-Zionism, whose source of antagonism is not Zionism but the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. The logic of political anti-Zionism is built around the classic conspiracy theory featuring a cabalistic Jewish world power on the world scene. Plagiaristic czarist agents brought that theory to an art form in the creation of the *Protocols*. Hitler used the theory, the *Protocols*, and occasionally the term *Zionism* in his war against the Jews.

Of course, one recognizes political anti-Zionism, so described, as a near-euphemism for political antisemitism. But political anti-Zionism has an identity of its own; it is a political antisemitism that uses Israel as a key ingredient in its image of a cabalistic Jewish world power. The chief sources of this political anti-Zionism are the Soviet Union, anti-American Third World ideologues, and Arab propagandists, in that order. Political anti-Zionism is the form in which political antisemitism is used by the "left wing."

Political antisemitism on the left was foreshadowed not so much by its antinationalism as by its taste for a statism bereft of mediating groups. The first watershed of modern antisemitism, it has been noted, was the kind of nonpluralistic European nationalism that, ironically, was associated with the liberation of the Jews from the ghetto. That was the import of Count Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre's famous statement demanding individual and religious liberty for the Jews, but also demanding of the Jews that they become "French people" rather than constituting themselves as a separate community. It was, of course, a tragic flaw of European nationalist liberalism, which became a fearful right-wing instrument.

But another watershed of modern antisemitism was prefigured when Lenin outlawed antisemitism in the Soviet Union at the same time that he began to disband Jewish community organizations. This ideological antipathy to Jewish life was less redolent of Clermont-Tonnerre than of his contemporary, Jean Jacques Rousseau, who insisted that nothing should intervene between the individual and the benign state. Yet, compounded from whatever historical tendencies it possesses, political anti-Zionism, like old-fashioned political antisemitism, is a largely fictional device that is mainly used as an instrument in the retention or acquisition of political power. The Soviet Union, the prime ideological source of political anti-Zionism, has uses for that instrument on both domestic and world political scenes. The ideology, which is simple enough, gets repeated day after day in the official press and literature of the USSR. There is little deviation from the formula, as Lev Lorneev expressed it in 1982:

an important role in the psychological war of imperialism is allotted to Zion whose ultimate goal in political practice is the achievement of maximum dominance for the Jewish bourgeoisie in the system of capitalism and the liquidation of the countries of socialism. With the support of all the other forces of world reaction, the subversive activity of Zionism has now acquired very impressive dimensions. On account of this, a correct analysis of complicated world problems and important international events will hardly be possible if the degree of participation in them of Zionism is not taken into account.<sup>10</sup>

Korneev continued in the formula with a clear identification of Zionism with the "fascist" state of Israel, and proceeded to delegitimize both Israel and the Jews. He further maintained that Israel calls together

people who live in more than a hundred countries, and who are in no way connected with each other. . . . The Jews ceased being a people, they lost their common language, and the Jewish ruling clique was turned, in the course of centuries, into a special type of intermediary cosmopolitan group in which rabbis, merchants, usurers and other such exploiters dominated. . . . Centuries-long practice over the whole earth allowed Jewish merchants, usurers and bankers to concentrate in their hands incalculable wealth; it is not for nothing that the name Rothschild became the synonym for the man of unlimited wealth.<sup>11</sup>

The more naked words *Jewish* and *Jewry* began to appear on their own as the linkages were established in this conspiracy theory: "The position of Jewish capital is very significant in France, England, Sweden, Australia, Holland and several other countries. At the same time, the Jewish bourgeoisie is American, English, French and so on, that is, part of the plutocracy of the country in which it resides. Thus, Jewry has a double character, which is expressed in its ideology and political character."<sup>12</sup>

This is the package of political anti-Zionism as it is produced, used internally, and exported by the Soviet Union. It is, in fact, old-fashioned political antisemitism, with the added ingredient of Israel. *However, Israel is not the prime target of political anti-Zionism, as it is in the case of nationalist anti-Zionism.* As Yuri Ivanov, a leading Soviet theorist on Jewish matters, put it: "Zionism is the ideology, the complex system of organizations and the political practice of the big Jewish bourgeoisie which has merged with the monopolistic circles of the United States and other imperialistic powers. . . . The ruling circles of Israel entered the international Jewish concern as junior partners."<sup>13</sup>

Although Israel is not the chief target of political anti-Zionism, the existence of Israel provides this new version of political antisemitism with a seeming credibility it would not otherwise have, especially for the left wing, and establishes a link in the conspiracy web that serves the ideological purposes of Third World anti-American rhetoric around the world, even when that rhetoric is not strikingly pro-Soviet. It is, after all, a fact that Israel and the United States are close allies. It is also a fact that Jews around the world support Israel politically and financially. These facts are a cause of embitterment for Arab nationalists, and they are carefully noted by Third World ideologues who have taken up the cause of Arab nationalism and who typically describe Israel as a "handmaiden of U.S. imperialism."

Jordan's representative at the United Nations, Hazem Nuseibeh, spoke the UN debate on December 15, 1980, in this fashion: "The representative of the Zionist entity is evidently incapable of concealing his deep-seated hatred towards the Arab world for having broken loose from the notorious exploitation of its natural resources, long held in bondage and plundered by his own people's cabal, which controls and manipulates the rest of humanity by controlling the money and wealth of the world."<sup>14</sup>

Just as the links among "international Zionism, the United States, and imperialism" are constantly made part of the weave of conspiracy theory by some Arab spokespersons, so have they become useful for the non-Arab ideologues of Third World anti-Americanism. In a characteristic article entitled "The Class Origins of Zionist Ideology," by a professor at Tuskegee Institute, the author stated: "It was somewhat symbolic that the original draft of [Herzl's] *The Jewish State* was entitled *An Address to the Rothschilds* and intended for the private use of the Rothschild family. . . . That Zionism expressed the interests of Jewish finance capital did not negate the fact that Zionism also was an ideology of world imperialism."<sup>15</sup>

Similar expressions have been found all over that ideological landscape. At one point, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) published a cartoon depicting a hand with the Star of David and a dollar sign on it pulling nooses around the necks of Nasser and Muhammed Ali; the SNCC then asked the readers whether they knew "that the famous European Jews, the Rothschilds, who have long controlled the wealth of many European nations, were involved in the original conspiracy with the British to create the 'State of Israel'?"<sup>16</sup>

It is not that all Arab nationalists or Third World anti-Americanists embrace political anti-Zionism. However, it is important to note that the currency of political anti-Zionism, as distinct from nationalist anti-Zionism, is a grave potential source of political antisemitism in the world today.

### Attitudes Based on U.S.-Israeli Relations

It is important to note that sentiments about Israel and about the Jews in the United States do not turn primarily around either the axis of nationalistic anti-Zionism or that of political anti-Zionism. The attitudes of most Americans about Israel are primarily shaped by pragmatic considerations of "U.S. national interest." A common misperception is that Americans were most sympathetic to Israel at the time of its creation, following hard on the U.S. war against Nazism and the revelation of the Holocaust. Distance from that period, according to that misperception, has eroded American sympathy. But overall American sympathy for Israel has increased with the years. Thus, six surveys of American sympathy between the years 1947 and 1949 show a median of 33 percent of Americans favoring the Israelis and 12 percent favoring the Arabs. A review of 15 surveys between 1970 and 1983 shows a median of 47 percent of Americans favoring the Israelis and 7 percent favoring the Arabs.<sup>17</sup>

It may be that the 24 percent of Americans who said they were more sympathetic to the Israelis in November 1947 were a somewhat more solid and less changeable bloc than the 49 percent who said they were more sympathetic to the Israelis in February 1983. (At both times, 12 percent said they were more sympathetic to the Arabs.) After all, this growing American proclivity to "sympathize" with the Israeli cause carries with it a limited commitment. We know, for example, that the portion of the American public who sympathizes with Israel will typically retreat when asked whether we should be militarily involved on Israel's behalf, even to the extent of selling arms. But, although the American public's willingness to send arms to Israel has varied more than the "sympathy" quotient in the face of differing circumstances, that index of support has also generally risen over the years.

There have been a number of signs that the American public's attitudes toward Israel, have, from the beginning, been shaped by strategic considerations, as signalled by the U.S. government. In November 1947, when the U.S. government announced its approval of a UN partition plan that would include Israel, 65 percent of the American public said they approved. But in April 1948, when the U.S. government announced that it opposed that same plan, only 26 percent of the American public approved.<sup>18</sup> In 1968, when the members of one representative American sample were asked whether they were willing for the United States to send arms to Israel, only about a quarter replied in the affirmative; but when the same people, at the same time, were asked whether they would be willing to send arms to Israel "if the Soviets were arming the Arabs," the affirmative answer more than doubled. Moreover, American public support has remained stable in its support of Israel, despite its disagreements with specific Israeli actions and oral postures. Accordingly, a Gallup release of July 1982 reported that,

"although as many Americans disapprove as approve of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, the action appears not to have altered Americans' basic loyalties in the Middle East. . . . In an analogous situation last summer, a *Newsweek* poll conducted by the Gallup organization found that America's reaction to Israel's bombing of PLO positions in Beirut was more critical. Fifty percent said the bombing was not justified and 31 percent said that it was. But that survey, too, found no change in Americans' basic sympathies.

There is much evidence on that score. In a July 1981 Yankelovich poll, Americans were virtually split on such questions as whether Israel was wrong in its attitude toward a Palestinian state on the West Bank or whether Israel treated Arabs badly, but these same Americans still registered their sympathy for the Israelis over the Arabs by a five-to-one ratio.

In sum, these cues suggest that American support for Israel has less to do with any intrinsic emotional ties to that country, or with Zionist ideologies, than with perceptions of U.S. national interest. The term *national interest* is a commodious one. National interest is not just a matter of rarefied geopolitics or military strategy, although Israel is prevalently seen as the only politically stable and militarily viable ally

the United States in that area. That perception has to do with U.S. national security, and with the inhibition of Soviet expansion in the area; but it also has to do with access to oil, the U.S. economy, and American jobs. Finally, it has to do with peace, another popular aspect of perceived U.S. national interest.

The perception of Israel as a free, Western-style, democratic society—the only one in the Middle East—not only affects Israel's ability to complement those other U.S. goals in the Middle East but it is significant in itself as well. Israel's political and public culture is familiar and qualifies Israel as part of that circle of wagons known as the association of free societies, patently important for the United States. American sympathy for Israel is predominantly based on some combination of these perceived elements of U.S. national interest, rather than on sentiments related to the Holocaust or to core Zionism.

This favorable American attitude toward Israel serves as a natural deterrent against negative attitudes about Jews spilling over to negative attitudes about Israel, especially among those who have some strong sense of investment in the "U.S. national interest." That favorable attitude would include the great majority of Americans, notably the segment of the population that has been most prone to conventional antisemitism in the past. The ideology of the rampant right-wing antisemitism of the 1920s and 1930s centered on the Americanism and anticommunism that now calls for support of Israel. Yet a reversal of this predominantly favorable attitude toward Israel would not necessarily create, in itself, a wave of antisemitism in the United States, but the deterrent would no longer be present if such a reversal occurred, and there would be the added phenomenon of American Jewry promoting an Israel seen as antipathetic to the United States.

### In Summary and Foreboding

With respect to the relationship between attitudes toward Israel and attitudes toward Jews, the evidence adduced leads to some hard conclusions about today's situation, but it can only provide some softer suggestions about the possible permutations of tomorrow. Jews tend to have a sense of "foreboding" that can be pushed over into paranoia but more often is a fairly sensible concern about the evil potential in currently satisfactory but volatile situations.<sup>19</sup>

*Antisemitism is not today a serious source of anti-Israel feeling* primarily because, within perceptions of the U.S.-Israeli alliance, conventional antisemitism tends to be tied to values that would lead to support of Israel or, at least, would deter antagonism to Israel. But despite the evidence that within large statistical groupings there does not seem to be a significant relationship between antisemitism and anti-Israeli feelings, to believe that hard-core anti-semites find it easy to be partial to a Jewish state would be contrary to good sense. There is evidence, indeed of a relatively small pocket of population in which a relationship exists between the two attitudes. In one 1981 survey, it was found that 23 percent of the population was counted as antisemitic because its

members held so many negative beliefs about Jews. Almost the same proportion, the 20 percent of the population that was "highly favorable to Israel" were among those counted as antisemitic. But among those "unfavorable to Israel," 32 percent were antisemitic. In short, there is undoubtedly a hard core of antisemites in the United States whose negative attitudes extend to the Jewish state. But it is a small core, and one that does not yet seriously affect the general climate of favorable American feelings toward Israel.

*Anti-Israel feeling is not today a serious source of antisemitism.* This converse disconnection is an even more direct result of the prevalent climate of partiality toward Israel. It is not possible now to disentangle the primacy of antisemitism or of anti-Israelism in the hard core that is both antisemitic and anti-Israel. But because of the prevailing circumstances with respect to U.S.-Israeli relations, that hard core is not a major factor today in this country. And for the great bulk of the American population, there is today no significant connection between negative feelings toward Israel and negative feelings toward Jews.

Parenthetically, the same evidence on that score suggests that neither is there a significant direct connection between positive feelings toward Israel and positive feeling toward Jews. Indeed, in the aforementioned 1981 survey, only 6 percent of the population said that the existence of Israel made them think more highly of Jews, and a slightly smaller percentage said that Israel's existence made them think less highly of Jews. But whatever the significance of such a subjective self-analysis, certain indirect effects cannot be cavalierly discounted. There has been some evidence in the past, for example, that Americans who know Jews best, in a friendly context, tend to be more sympathetic to Israel. To paraphrase a Hadley Cantril premise about public opinion: When attitudes are not highly structured, they tend to move in the direction of attitudes held strongly by friends and associates. But what is even more powerfully (if indirectly) true is that the image of the American Jews as familiarly integrated into the U.S. culture can presumably buttress the image of Israel as a Western democratic society, one component of perceived U.S. national interest in Israel. When Americans were asked in a Cambridge Survey to compare Israelis and Arabs on a number of cultural characteristics, the item on which the Americans rated Israelis most favorably had to do with which group was "most like Americans." On that item, Israelis were favored by a five-to-one ratio.<sup>20</sup>

There are undoubtedly such indirect effects. But they do not disturb the present evidence that antisemitism and anti-Israel feeling are not to be equated, and that neither is the prime source for the other in the United States today.

*The Foreboding Syndrome.* The favorable American climate toward Israel is reversible. Prevalent negative attitudes would not only remove a deterrent but would also be likely to provide a stimulant to antisemitism, presumably built around American Jewish activity on behalf of an unpopular Israel. The foundation underlying antisemitic views is reflected in the fact that between one-quarter and one-third of Americans have been consistently willing to say that American Jews are more loyal to or closer to Israel than to the United States. The Cambridge survey

twice (in 1974 and 1975) put the question in a most abrasive way: "Some people forget they are Americans when they rush to defend Israel." In both cases, a third of the Americans responded in the affirmative.<sup>21</sup>

It is noteworthy that the one apparently sharp break in the continuing favorable Gallup poll measurements of American attitudes toward Israel came in September 1982. As earlier observed, Gallup had indicated in July of that year that basic American support of Israel over the Arabs had remained steady, in the face of a number of Israeli actions of which the American public disapproved and in the face of Israel's incursion into Lebanon. But in September 1982, the ratio of approval for Israel over the Arabs, which had been 49-10 in July 1981, dipped to 32-28. This followed a series of highly publicized rows between the governments of the United States and Israel, culminating in President Reagan's proposal for the future of the West Bank, which the Israeli government rejected abruptly and with an unusually strong personal attack on the president.

Israel's importance for "U.S. national interest" had been impugned. The ratio of approval for Israel over the Arabs snapped back quickly in the Gallup survey of January 1983 to a ratio of 49-12, as the air cleared between the two nations. Nevertheless, the episode provides support for the premise that circumstances touching on perceptions of U.S. national interest will largely determine the U.S. commitment to Israel. There also emerges an understandable uneasiness about the deterioration of goodwill toward American Jews under those circumstances.

It is conceivable but not too likely that U.S. policymakers will "abandon" Israel in the foreseeable future; the logic and tradition of that alliance is strong. But it is more conceivable that the United States' general circumstances at some given point could limit its ability to support Israel. There are strong veins of American sentiment that can only be described as isolationist, antimilitary, or at least opposed to active U.S. military involvement abroad.

If the United States' support of Israel were to waver on this account, or indeed on the additional account of domestic economic stress, American Jewish activity on behalf of restoring that support would predictably become even more vocal—and it is likely that such activity would be seen as contrary to U.S. national interest. The resentment that has been muted could, indeed, be reactivated.

The formulations here are functionally tied to the question of American antisemitism. The same equations are not applicable to France and the fourth largest Jewish community in the world. "French national interest" is differently perceived. Currents of pro-Arab, Third World, anti-American thought are, of course, much stronger. Susceptibility to left-wing political anti-Zionism is greater. However, many observers are similarly convinced that the future of antisemitism in France is tied to Middle East politics. As Henry Weinberg put it, "The renewed attacks on Jews during the recent Israeli action in Lebanon suggest that the potential for anti-Jewish violence in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict may become a permanent feature of life in France. In the end, the place of the Jew in French society will to a large extent be determined in a region distant from France's boundaries. As a senior French Jewish statesman phrased it in response to a question about the future of French Jewry: 'Everything depends on events in the Middle East.'"<sup>22</sup>

Since the 1930s, no one has been foolish enough to say "it can't happen." The possibility of the emergence of political antisemitism in the United States must always be kept open. But, in the modern world, political antisemitism means political anti-Zionism. Israel cannot be left out of the equation. As long as the U.S.-Israeli alliance is convincing, and made convincing by U.S. policymakers, right-wing political anti-Zionism is less likely in the United States. Nor is the ascendancy of left-wing political anti-Zionism any more likely in the United States' foreseeable future than the ascendancy of any left-wing political ideology. Less unlikely is that certain American streams of isolationist, antimilitary, and anti-American thought could hasten the deterioration of U.S. support of Israel under certain circumstances, with negative results for American Jews.

In any case, the signs suggest that antisemitism is not and probably will not be at the genesis of any widespread antagonism toward Israel; rather, any political antisemitism in the future will find its basis in antagonism toward Israel—and, more precisely, in the activity of Jews supporting an Israel toward which there has developed antagonism or apathy.

#### Notes

1. The hazards of survey information, especially in the face of different languages and time situations, are well known. However, in the case of the Middle East, the same questions have been asked so often by the same organizations over the course of so many different time situations that a comparison of the results is often useful. In other cases, survey material is no more than, but also no less than, suggestive. In most cases, where such material is used, the date and source are listed in the text and not endnoted. For other material, references are made to two compilations of survey results: Charles Herbert Stember et al., *Jews in the Minds of Men* (New York: Basic Books, 1966); and Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, "American Opinion Towards Israel and Jew" (unpublished manuscript, American Enterprise Institute, n.d.).

2. The correlations are as follows: (1) conventional antisemitism and sympathy for Israel =  $-.07$ ; (2) conventional antisemitism and perception of Jewish power =  $-.04$ ; and (3) conventional antisemitism and support of the PLO =  $-.09$ .

3. Stember, *op. cit.* pp. 116, 158.

4. *Ibid.* p. 162.

5. Jews more loyal to Israel than to the United States:

Year	Agree (%)	Source
1964	30	NORC
1974	26	NORC
1974	34	Yankelovich
1977	27	Yankelovich
1979	29	Gallup
1980	34	Gallup
1981	34	Gallup
1982 (March)	30	Gallup
1983 (January)	37	Gallup

6. Stember, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
7. Quoted in Elyakim Rubenstein, "Zionist Attitudes in the Jewish Dispute of 1936," *Jerusalem Quarterly* (Winter 1982):140.
8. Quoted in Ben Zion Bokser, "Rabbi Kook, the Arabs and the Japanese," *Judaism* (Spring 1983):185.
9. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (New York: Capricorn Books Edition, 1965), p. 265.
10. Lev Korneev, "For Whom is this Profitable? The Psychological War of International Zionism," *Neva* (May 1982).
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. Yuri Ivanov (Adviser on Jewish Affairs to the CPSU Central Committee), *Beware Zionism* (Moscow, 1969).
14. Institute of Jewish Affairs, *Research Report* (December 1981):10.
15. Stephen Halbrook, "The Class Origins of Zionist Ideology," *Journal of Palestinian Studies* (Autumn 1972):87, 106.
16. SNCC Newsletter (June-July 1967).
- 17.

Date	Israelis (%)	More Sympathy for:		Source
		Arabs (%)		
Nov. 1947	24	12		Stember (p. 179)
Feb. 1948	35	16		Stember
June 1948	34	12		Stember
July 1948	36	14		Stember
Oct. 1948	33	11		Stember
March 1949	32	13		Stember
Feb. 1969	43	4		Gallup
Feb. 1970	38	2		Gallup
Aug. 1970	47	6		Harris
July 1971	46	7		Harris
Oct. 1973	47	6		Gallup
Nov. 1973	48	7		Roper
Dec. 1973	41	6		Roper
Dec. 1973	50	7		Gallup
Jan. 1976	56	9		Yankelovich
Jan. 1977	47	6		Gallup
June 1977	43	5		Gallup
Oct. 1980	45	13		Gallup
July 1981	49	10		Yankelovich
Sept. 1982	32	28		Gallup
Jan. 1983	49	12		Gallup

Source: *Midstream* (February 1983).

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18. Stember, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
19. Earl Raab, "Anti-Semitism in the 1980s," *Midstream* (February 1983).
20. Lipset and Schneider, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
22. Henry H. Weinberg, "French Jewry: Trauma and Renewal," *Midstream* (December 1982).