

Lagging Jewish Consciousness

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The public affairs instinct of the American Jewish community has become blunted. In 1978, thousands marched in American streets on behalf of Khomeini. If a dozen American "Nazis" had marched, the Jewish community would have been up in arms. But the Jewish community paid little real attention to the Khomeini crowds, which represented a force infinitely more dangerous to Jewish lives and security.

When President Carter wanted to win the undying friendship of the Saudis by sending them extra-lethal arms, the American Jewish community threw itself into total mobilization. But the Jewish community has been largely silent on the subjects of Taiwan or South Korea, or the defense budget of the United States — all of which will have a more lasting effect on the survival of Israel.

In the matter of a just and sound America, the American Jewish community pressed creditably for the equal rights amendment, and increased public employment for the poor, but paid no substantial attention to the economic/political issues, such as inflation, which would most affect the economic fate of America, its women, and its poor.

Something is obviously wrong.

One could say that fault lies not with the Jewish community, but with the issues. That is, the "broader issues," such as the defense budget or inflation, belong on the nation's agenda and on the agenda of individual American Jewish citizens; but, not being "Jewish issues," do not belong on the communal Jewish agenda.

If that is true, it means that historical events have made the Jewish agenda less relevant to Jewish security than it used to be. Once, the "broader issues" and the "Jewish issues" were more coincident.

Of course, there is the practical matter. Does the Jewish community have either the consensus or the resources to move on these broader issues? If that answer is negative, it suggests that the modus operandi of Jewish public affairs institutions has become outmoded.

It is also likely that the institutional and intellectual leadership of the Jewish community is not yet up to the realities of this quarter century. The ideologues of Jewish "universalism," and the ideologues of Jewish "particularism" both do us in; equally myopic as they peer in different directions. Their failures have nothing to do with "liberalism" or "conservatism" as some would have it, but with a common failure to identify the coherent nature of Jewish self-interest in public affairs.

Equal rights and treatment for Jews has, of course, always been the central domestic issue on the Jewish public affairs agenda. In recent years, "urban affairs" has been the "broader issue" related to equal rights for American Jews. "Urban affairs" is the polite term used to describe the massive social problems of America, such as poverty, unemployment, poor housing, failed public education.

Since Hitler at least, Jews have recognized that the democratic order which would best guarantee equal rights for Jews was finally dependent on a stable social order. The relationship between political anti-Semitism and political extremism is axiomatic. And political extremism in the modern world has always built on severely unremedied social problems, one way or another. Hitler did not come to power because the German people had a prime need for anti-Semitism. He came to power be-

cause of joblessness and inflation, and the divergent dissatisfactions of the working class and the middle class. It is out of that practical experience that Jews are doubly committed to the ethical precepts of social humanism.

In the circumstances of the 1950s and a good part of the 1960s, the issue of equal rights for Jews, and the broader urban affairs issues on which those equal rights heavily depended, were naturally and easily integrated.

Problems such as poverty and poor education were seen as largely coterminous with the problems of American blacks and other groups disadvantaged by discrimination. The civil rights campaign against discrimination was, of course, right up the Jewish alley: a struggle for the principles of equal rights, equal status, equal opportunity. It merged with the Jewish goal of a free political society.

Actually, the civil rights approach to urban problems worked better than we have generally given it credit for doing. The hub of the problem, the economic position of the black family, did improve considerably. Between 1950 and 1965, the real income, the real purchasing power of the black family increased by over 60 percent. It kept pace with the increase in white family purchasing power, a radically new phenomenon. But, the *relative* economic position did not improve. The lack of relative, "make-up" advancement raised, in the middle of the 1960s, the image of affirmative action. At that time, it meant a more assertive implementation of civil rights law. Employers had to go out in active search of qualified black workers; they had to be more systematic in the elimination of bias and so forth. It was during this new drive, between

1965 and 1970, that, for the first time, black family income improved relatively as well as absolutely. Each of the five-year periods between 1950 and 1965 had seen both the black and white family income increase by about 15 percent. Between 1965 and 1970, the white family income increased again by about 15 percent; but the black family income increased by about 33 percent. As a result, in those five years, the ratio of black to white income increased from 55 to 64 percent — a 9 percent catch-up increase in five years, as compared to a one percent catch-up increase in all of the preceding 15 years.

Obviously those figures cannot be glibly projected — but one must keep them in mind in order not to underestimate the practical importance of the civil rights campaign — or the black community's commitment to affirmative action.

However, there were other strong factors operating. Between 1950 and 1965, the American economy created an average of 4 million new jobs every 5 years; between 1965 and 1970, the American economy created almost 8 million new jobs. That fact along with the affirmative action push, characterized the period of greatest black economic advance.

The fact is that our entire approach to urban affairs during those years was based on the assumption that the American economy would keep rolling in the way that it had. But between 1970 and 1975 the rate of jobs created in the economy dropped to an earlier level. And, more significantly, while the real income of all Americans had doubled in the previous twenty years, the real income of Americans, black or white, did not advance at all between 1970 and 1975, mainly as a result of inflation.

Obviously, the circumstances had changed. No longer were urban affairs and civil rights synonymous terms. To use a shorthand, *economic* issues rather than *civil rights* issues had come center-stage. Removing the disabilities from blacks and other disadvantaged minorities was no longer the sum and substance of the

solution. Beating inflation had also to be part of the solution. The economy itself was somehow faltering. Nor was it simply a matter of some greater infusion of social generosity by the government. In fact, the amount of money, in constant uninflated dollars, which the federal government expended on social programs, doubled between 1960 and 1970, doubled again in the five years between 1970 and 1975 — but the situation deteriorated. The growth rate of real income and of social progress was lagging behind the growth rate of taxation and government social expenditure. All this foreshadowed Proposition 13 and the so-called tax revolt. But the point is that neither civil rights nor generosity seemed to be enough in dealing with urban problems.

It would seem that the Jewish community needs to develop a cohesive viewpoint towards complex economic issues if, as a community, it is going to enter the modern arena of urban affairs with the same elan, sophistication, and effectiveness with which it was part of the civil rights period of urban affairs. But that may not be possible.

Jews had an age-old expertise in civil rights and an age-old impulse for the social humanism which it promised to implement. Neither the biblical-age prophetic imperative towards social humanism, nor historical experience equipped Jews to deal as a community with the *technological* problems of social reform. A body of reasonably experienced Jewish lay people and professionals is capable of evaluating a given proposal on fair employment or civil rights. But on the basis of what experience and of what consensus does the Jewish community today evaluate a given proposal on, say, increasing employment and housing while reducing inflation?

Perhaps this new state of affairs suggests that the Jewish community, as such, should withdraw to a narrower island of explicit "Jewish issues," such as church-state problems and overt anti-Semitism. This limited agenda would still have its own importance, but would not have the same significance for Jewish security that the earlier agenda had; it would not address those matters which now

most seriously determine Jewish status and political anti-Semitism in America.

Perhaps that deficiency cannot be helped. The fact that an issue is important to Jewish security is not enough to warrant its actionable appearance on the Jewish communal agenda. In order to fully qualify as a "Jewish issue," there should be some special Jewish factors and knowledge, drawn from group experience, which apply to the *remedies* as well as to problems.

But it is suggested that there *are* Jewish factors, areas of special group experience, which relate to the more contemporary economic issues. In fact they are, at base, the same Jewish factors which applied to civil rights issues, but less perceptibly now; or perhaps somewhat misperceived then. A first clue to this Jewish point of view can be found in the *political* implications of post civil rights economic issues.

Many Jews sensed these political implications as they were developing in the late 1960s. Not only were the factors of sheer social generosity and civil rights not enough — but they seemed to be moving in directions antithetical to Jewish concerns about a politically free society.

This is not an abstract point. There are some practical political principles of Jewish survival and security that have derived from experience. For that purpose, homely definitions of political freedom can turn around a government's ability to tolerate and accommodate to differences — both individual differences and group differences. The Jews have posed that kind of challenge to more societies over a longer period than any other human group. Most of those societies have failed the challenge, and Jews have hopefully learned a great deal in the process.

Jews have lived in host societies where they were allowed free social existence either as individuals or as a group — but not both. In either case, the Jews usually ended up disadvantaged — and often under attack. In much of the Middle Ages, the European Jews had virtually no relationship as individuals to the larger

societies in which they lived. They existed only as part of the Jewish collective. Eventually, as Cecil Roth described it, "the circle of human interaction was intolerably confined. Life time indescribably petty."

But when the modern age awarded political liberty to the individual Jew, it usually did so in self-consciously ethnic nations which were hostile towards his separate group existence. In this case as well, Jews found themselves stunted, disadvantaged and eventually oppressed.

And as the modern age progressed, the Jews learned another lesson in survival: it was not just ethnic or nationalist monism which impelled hostility towards Jews. It was, of course, a political and ideological monism which became the deepest scourge.

Rousseau wrote the early lyrics: for every individual's own good, there must be "an absolute surrender of the individual, with all of his rights and all of his powers, to the community as a whole." Therefore, it would be essential "that there should be no partial society within the state." Thus, the early European states of the modern era rejected the Jews on grounds that they were ethnic deviants; and the later European states of Leninist or Hitlerian bent, rejected the Jews even more vigorously because they comprised "partial societies," standing between the total beneficent state and the citizenry.

It would have been surprising if, out of these varied tribal memories, Jews did not retain some power to detect "the scent of dangerous government," even when they could not clearly analyze the exact nature of the danger. And in the late 1960s many Jews spontaneously caught the scent of danger in the "quota issue," although the nature of that danger may have been somewhat mistaken.

In brief, individual freedom, the ability of the individual to exercise his or her differences, to be accepted on individual merit, seemed endangered by a rigid group quota concept, which turned the affirmative action thrust on its head. The historically based instinct of the Jews that such a direction ran counter to political freedom.

Employment quotas were by no means the only important element of this new threatening approach to urban affairs. Other "group" approaches gathered strength during the 1970s, threatening the double nature of American freedom — such as proportional representation in politics; and separate track bicultural education in the public schools.

But there is another dimension to the quota approach, which usually gets less attention. It is the concept that a beneficent, socially generous government should so order relationships among people as to eliminate the impact of individual differences. This may be the most abiding meaning of the "quota approach." In a prophetic section of his comments on the De Funis case, Justice Douglas suggested that the government should support preferential treatment for a person, not because of race, but because of disadvantaged background of any kind. And some suggested that an individual should be given equalizing treatment if that individual is born with any disadvantageous genes, such as less general intelligence or mechanical ability than the next fellow. After all, it isn't his fault. Far from the original concept of affirmative action, this has nothing to do with race, or with groupification — but just with the all-powerful role of the government in ordering the fate of the individual. In this transformation, "affirmative action" is no longer a civil rights issue; it is an issue in economic philosophy, with political implications.

Now, Jewish experience does not dictate that government is the natural enemy of the Jew. To the contrary, Jews have often been saved from mob brutality by a strong government capable of firmly laying down law and order.

The quality which evokes the "scent of dangerous government" is not the strength of a government, nor its size, nor even attendant bureaucratic and regulatory growth. In this dense and complex world, no socially responsible government can withdraw to some fabled *laissez-faire* land of the past. The ominous quality of government, in Jewish experi-

ence, is related to a government's designed attitude towards individual and group achievement. In modern times, the most inexorable hostility towards both individual and group differences — towards personal freedom and towards "partial societies" — is engendered by a government whose design is to assign satisfactions, rather than to leave room for their achievement.

Achievement, it should be noted, is not to be equated with the pursuit of material gain. To the contrary, the psychological literature distinguishes between the "achiever," who will do a task for the sake of doing; and the non-achiever, who will do a task only if there is a material reward. The root of the word "achievement" does not carry the meaning of "acquiring"; it carries the meaning of "beginning an act and carrying it through to the end." Achievement has to do with creativity, spiritual growth, and self-expression. Any state hostility towards individual and group differences is, exactly, state hostility towards unassigned and uncontrolled achievement. The right to achievement, in the Jewish experience, is synonymous with political freedom. It is in this sense that Jews can understand Hannah Arendt's definition of political freedom as freedom from politics.

So there is a general "Jewish viewpoint" to be applied to proposed political remedies for modern social problems. That general viewpoint is compounded of a double imperative: to insistently seek social remedy from government on behalf of the needy; while at the same time limiting government's capacity to inhibit achievement. That is a precarious prescription; it may not even be a likely one; but it is ours.

The nature of that double imperative has not changed. Circumstances have. In the civil rights period, for the most part, social remedy exactly consisted of government pushing the principle of achievement. It is for this reason as well that the Jewish point of view on urban affairs was so often capable of being translated into a definitive, consensual platform. Not only did the two imperatives mesh, but the indicated remedies were contained within the nar-

row boundaries of the Jewish viewpoint on urban affairs.

In the new post civil rights period of economic issues, there are considerations which are not bounded by that Jewish viewpoint. Indeed, it is tempting to say that the Jewish viewpoint on urban affairs has little to say about specific remedies for social problems except in a negative sense: to point out the *politically* unacceptable ways in which a government should attempt to remedy its social problems. That is in itself not an unimportant viewpoint to bring to the national discussion table, to mix with other considerations.

However, if the internal logic of the Jewish viewpoint is extended, it may suggest something more. To be brutally unfashionable, the Jewish viewpoint may suggest a practical political stake in the American economic system, as we have ideally perceived it: a "system" built around normatively free and private enterprise — that is, around concomitants of individual achievement and self-dependency.

That system has been vulnerable to enormous abuse. Whole groups have been excluded from it; robber barons have plundered it; many victims have been produced by it. Government, labor unions, civil rights movements, and other forces have to continually find means to control these perversions of the system. There may indeed be times, out of other considerations, when it will be necessary to violate the system by exercising stringent government control over some of its wayward parts. But this should be done self-consciously, not gleefully, as a necessary calculated risk. For, as far as we know, there is a direct relationship between that economic system and the political system of freedom to which we are committed, the common ground being the achieving society.

But then there is more to it than that. In pursuing effective social remedies, there is the apparent practical fact that this system of ours cannot bear the burden of too disproportionate a non-systemic approach — one that is not built around relatively free and private enterprise.

That disproportionate public burden is what inflationary spirals, tax revolts, and the like are very much about.

The guide-line of the *systemic* still leaves much room for disagreements — but it is a compass which can be used as one criterion in evaluating public policy proposals.

It seems to be a compass, incidentally, which is congruent with the current highly publicized "public mood." But, as it is drawn here, it is not a faddish impulse for frugality: it is a coherent point of view on those economic issues which have political implications that are of demonstrated importance to the Jews. It is a point of view, needless to say, which is still bounded by the imperative of social humanism.

The Jewish point of view on American domestic affairs is not seen completely, however, until it is seen as a central part of a Jewish point of view on American foreign affairs.

Just as equal rights for Jews has always been the prime domestic item on the American Jewish public affairs agenda, so has the survival of Israel been the prime item on the American Jewish agenda with respect to American foreign policy. But the growing deficiency of the American Jewish community on matters related to Israel and American foreign policy largely lies in the failure to integrate these two items and points of view.

As we entered the third quarter of the 20th century, the common thesis on American-Israeli relations ran something like this: the United States is the most powerful nation in the world. The United States has a natural commitment to Israel: moral, cultural — and political, Israel being a solid extension of the Free Western World. Israel is safe.

In point of fact, the American government was not all that friendly towards Israel in those years. The State Department was constantly engaged in trying to establish prior Arab alliances. But the alliances crumbled in an unstable Arab world. And the basic thesis seemed to stand, indeed, became strengthened after 1967.

But that image changed dramati-

cally, with such developments as the political emergence of the Third World, the "oil crisis," and the Vietnamese denouement. The United States seemed to lose its moral, economic, and moral hegemony. Its commitments became suspect, along with its ability to sustain them, now culminating in Taiwan and Iran. Its will as a world power became suspect.

However, it is more evident than ever that Israel's existence depends on America's support. American Jewry's *point of view* on this score still rests on the foundation that America's national interest, for a variety of reasons, lies in support of Israel. But it now must extend further to the understanding that it is in America's national interest, only if America has a commitment to its own power stature in the world. And, indeed, without that power stature, a commitment to Israel would mean very little.

It would be a distortion to apply the "hawk-dove" axis to this proposition. Perhaps, following Peter Berger's lead by way of Pareto, one should substitute Lion and Fox images for those of Hawk and Dove. Lion signifies a dependence on American power; Fox signifies a dependence on international cooperation. Obviously, both images have to do with relative emphases rather than absolute positions.

The Fox may be a Fox because he no longer believes in the viability of American power. (America has become toothless.) But, joined with that in varying degrees is the Fox's mistrust of American power on the world scene. (America is malevolent.) The Lion tends to believe in the benevolence of American power. The sustaining logic here is that America is still the only strong guardian of political freedom and of politically free societies in the world. The Fox would tend to be more relativistic in his judgments about other political societies, and, indeed, about the nature of freedom.

Here joins the Jewish point of view on political freedom and American domestic affairs; and the Jewish point of view on American foreign affairs. This juncture is based on belief that there has been a special congruence between American his-

tory and the Jewish viewpoint on political freedom.

When John Adams originally drafted the preamble to the Massachusetts Constitution, he substituted for Jefferson's phrase, "all men are created equal" his own version: "All men are born equally free and independent." It didn't have the same poetic quality as Jefferson's phrase, and languished, but it more literally described what was meant. For a variety of historical reasons, the United States became consecrated to the principle of achievement as no other country had. (We all know the Tragic Flaw, of course, but it was the flaw which was eventually to test and, hopefully, to prove the rule.)

In 1818, the American Jew, Mordecai Noah, said this of America: "Here, no inequality of privileges, no asperity of opinion, no invidious distinctions exist. Dignity is blended with equality, justice administered impartially. Merit alone has a fixed value."

Eighty years later, Max Nordau summarized the condition of the "liberated" European Jew: "He has soil under his feet, and he has no claim to a hole into which he can fit as a welcome, equal member. Among his Christian fellow countrymen, he can count on neither justice nor benevolence because of his character or of his achievement."

However exaggerated either of these accounts might have been, Noah's speech could not easily have been made in Europe, nor Nordau's in America. They caught the political spirit of their respective continents.

The point is that out of the American workshop there developed something quite new with respect to the freedom to achieve. America came to stand for this principle of political freedom, even in the frequent breach. If the United States were to lapse in its commitment to this principle; or in its role as the world's active standard-bearer of this principle, at a time when the tide with opposite ideologies, then a period of political dark age would predictably grip the world.

Many Leninists who came to de-

spise the Soviet regime, retained faith in the principle of the Bolsheviks' "October Revolution." For the Lions' logic to be sustained, it is necessary for them to have at least as deep a faith in America's "July Revolution," and what it has come to stand for at best.

As to the Jewish agenda, it should be clear that Israel's survival depends not so much on its relationship with its Arab neighbors, as with the fate of America and the "July Revolution" on the world scene. One needs no more documentation than the contemporary record of the United Nations.

Or one might simply look at the development of the PLO, which is no longer to be seen primarily as the protagonist of Palestine Arab liberation, but rather as a world-wide apparatus for training, arming and stimulating anti-American political activity: in Iran, in Turkey, in Germany, in Uganda, in Japan, in Nicaragua.

Indeed, the concerted attack on America and on the July Revolution around the globe is not just rhetorical but is martially implemented by "revolutionary" and military attacks on targets of opportunity associated with the free world.

If that is true, then those Americans with a special interest in Israel's survival would be drawn to the Leonine approach in American foreign affairs in general. As many Congressmen and military observers have pointed out with some annoyance: how can Jewish groups talk Lion with respect to Israel, and ignore the necessary basic framework of a Leonine American foreign policy?

Yet the organized Jewish community has been largely silent with respect to American defense requirements, as it has been on other related subjects. And the paralysis of the organized Jewish community with respect to American foreign policy in the Third World is noteworthy. Where were the Jews in helping to develop a cogent American foreign policy on the political problems of all emerging nations, such as those in Latin America and Africa?

Here the "double imperative" of a Jewish point of view, translated to foreign affairs, would insistently

seek to modify or replace oppressive governments everywhere; while at the same time holding suspect those alternatives which would likely place into power enemies of America and of the principles of July. This, too, is a precarious prescription; not destined for universal success, "third camps" being in short supply; but it is ours and promises more success than the bumbling *ad hoc* policies America has typically followed on this front.

President John F. Kennedy, in an earlier era, understood it exactly when he pledged that the countries of the Third World should be helped to loose themselves from colonial and post-colonial tyranny, but not in order to be subjected to a "far more iron tyranny."

In sum, any Jewish community approach to an American foreign policy in support of Israel which does not also address a broader framework of American foreign policy is increasingly out-moded and ineffective. But the apparent failure of the American Jewish community on this subject suggests a larger failure to understand the meaning of America; and to see Israel as one link in the significant relationship of the modern Jew to the July revolution.

But is it fair to charge the Jewish community, or Jewish public affairs agencies with such failures? Just as American urban affairs have moved from civil rights issues to economic issues, so have American foreign affairs affecting Jews moved more clearly from Israel-Arab issues to more global issues. As in the case of domestic affairs, this would seem to limit Jewish communal expertise and hinder the possibility of a Jewish communal consensus.

A significant success of Jewish public affairs agencies after World War II was to rectify one of the most shocking of the organizational failures in the 1930s: fragmentation. That organizational fragmentation, even on potentially consensual issues, was, at least as much as apathy, the reason for tragic American Jewish political failures in the 1930s.

So the Jewish community pulled itself together after World War II, establishing ingenious mechanisms

for finding and acting jointly on public affairs consensus, without destroying organizational pluralism. This was done in the only way possible for a voluntary community. A majority of the Jewish population has "volunteered" for the community by joining a Jewish organization or synagogue which expresses some particular pattern of Jewish interests, backgrounds, or lifestyles. When people periodically elected or appointed by these various organized segments come together in public affairs mechanisms, they can fairly represent prevailing sentiments in the organized Jewish community.

On another front, the Jewish fund-raising agencies exerted an even greater centrifugal force. During the third quarter century, these fund-raising bodies were building a new strong American Jewish consciousness around the issue of Israel. This will be accounted an historic contribution to American Jewish life. American Jewish consciousness was becoming diffuse; the sense of Jewish self-interest was becoming dim. There was indeed a kind of lost mini-generation in the 1950s, somewhat paralleling a lost mini-generation in the 1930s. Organizationally, the fund-raising bodies recouped a new generation around Israel and kindled a new sense of Jewish self-interest. Especially after the watershed of the 1967 War, the centrifugal tendencies of the fund-raising agencies, and of the public affairs agencies with their coalition mechanisms, merged.

In addition, the individual Jewish public affairs agencies have partly been caught in the jam-pot of their formidable successes in the period between World War II and the late 1960s. These successes were real and contributory, although they were also "in the flow": the after-glow of a virtuous war against Hitler, astonishing economic expansion in America, the primacy of the simple civil rights issue at home; the apparent unsailability of the virtue of Israel's existence, and of America's stake in Israel.

Under those conditions, the major

Jewish public affairs agencies flourished, grew in size and staff, and became necessarily addicted to organizational success. These agencies had had their origins as kinds of "caucus" in American Jewish life, differentiated as to agenda, attitude, and constituency. But the caucus nature of these agencies has been eroding.

There has been the social homogenization of American Jews, as well as the organizational search for broader membership. The individual organizations have themselves become less caucus-like and more coalition-like in nature. They have increasingly tended to stay out of issues which are controversial within the Jewish community. This does not speak to the legitimacy of their separate existences; they contribute differentiated talents and resources to the common enterprise — as well as a healthy competitive edge. But less and less do they provide differentiated viewpoints.

Ironically, it is this bundle of centrifugal tendencies, so necessary and healthy for American Jewish life in the third quarter of this century, which now endangers the community's effectiveness in public affairs. In a sense, the Jewish community and its institutions have become over-committed to consensus. As a result, the institutions perpetuate their own narrow boundaries, and their own irrelevancy to the more important current matters of Jewish self-interest. More and more will they come to represent a kind of illusory Maginot Line of self-defense.

It is time for the pendulum to swing back. Indicated is some kind of functional decentralization, without a return to the anarchy of the past. But how can that be expressed as institutional reform?

Put one way, there is indicated a shift in emphasis *away from* the image of Jewish public affairs institutions "taking positions" on issues as grand spokesmen — although there remains a critical role for the consensual voice on certain issues. The shift would be *towards* the image of those

institutions becoming the well-springs and training grounds for informed Jewish individuals acting more autonomously in the public arena with a "Jewish point of view."

If truth be told, it was the existence of such individuals which led to the organizations, rather than the other way around. It is this effect which must be renewed in order to make the total Jewish enterprise more relevant to contemporary Jewish needs; and to avoid the rigors of organizational consensus.

The "Jewish point of view" with which individuals acted in the public arena was once more naturally come by. It came with mother's milk, neighborhood experiences, the tales of grandfather or Rabbi. The point is that a "Jewish point of view" on domestic and foreign affairs in the modern world is no longer so simple by half; nor are the natural sources so accessible. Jewish institutions now have to work at it. Too many Jews within the centrifugal establishment have been constricted in viewpoint; too many Jews active "outside" are without Jewish guideposts.

Some current users of the language might choose to call such over-arching Jewish point of view public affairs "neo-particularism," with the understanding that "what's good for the Jews" has to be seen in larger terms than we have recently been using. Others, according to their bent, may choose to call it "neo-universalism," with the understanding that what's good for the Jews in this respect is good for the world. As usual, it doesn't make any difference. In either case, if Jewish public affairs behavior is to be more relevant, it will have to start with a more urgent understanding of the principles of July, as they relate to politically free, achieving and humane societies. And it will have to act more boldly on the proposition that everything which must be done for the ascendancy of those principles in the world today, must be done for the survival of Jews everywhere. ■

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