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The Issue of Dual Loyalty

Since the Fall of 1973, there have been fears about a backlash against American Jews because of events connected with Israel. The logic is simple and compelling, whether the United States parts company with Israel or becomes more deeply involved on behalf of Israel. The basic risk factors are the deteriorated economic condition of America and Americans, and the closely related matter of oil. In the background is the fact that Americans do connect Israel and American Jewry. Over the past ten years, a quarter to a third of all Americans have expressed the belief that American Jews "are more loyal to Israel than to the United States." A backlash is indicated if the United States parts company with Israel and American Jews protest vigorously, as they would. And a backlash is indicated if the United States becomes more deeply involved on behalf of Israel. In either case, sizeable segments of the population would feel that their material well-being was being threatened by the disloyal tribal activity of American Jews.

This backlash logic seemed derailed by reality in the oil energy crisis following the Yom Kippur war. Americans blamed the oil companies first, the politicians second, the Arabs third. The fears subsided. But then, as the economic situation worsened, General George Brown's remarks at Duke University were publicized. The General's statement was not primarily so unsettling because of his stereotyping about Jews, banks and newspapers. The shocker was this: If the hub of America's national - and military - interest in the Middle East is to contain the Soviet Union; and if Israel is a key to that containment, why would the American military complain

about any effort to strengthen America's support of Israel?

To be sure, there has been some pique expressed in military journals about the diversion of armaments to Israel at a time when our own stockpiles are seen as too thin. This pique has been compounded by the feeling that many American Jews have contributed to the low-stockpile situation by their anti-military posture. This is not a new feeling: President Johnson had it within the context of the Vietnam war, and his emissaries complained to Jewish leaders.

There are now military spokesmen talking to Jewish leaders about the contradictory stance of those who want the US. to support Israel, and at the same time do not vigorously support a strong over-all American military position.

But more than pique is involved. The public effect of General Brown's remarks was to put the backlash logic on track again. The suggestion was that, while we cannot allow Soviet arms to overwhelm the Middle East at any given point, it may not be durably in our national interest to back Israel as fulsomely as we have; and we cannot allow special American Jewish influence to deter us from the national purpose.

There is an ugly phrase of this, which has long been absent from national discourse: dual loyalty. This charge against the Jews is, of course, a standard of right-wing anti-semitism. The fringe standard-bearers of right-wing anti-semitism were quick to recognize their favorite formula. The National States Rights party said that Americans should "not let the Jews destroy this courageous patriot who has the guts to tell it like it is." An advertisement in the Washington Post told about Jewish influence on " a Congress committed to the defense of

Israel no matter the cost or danger of the American people."

Gerald L.K. Smith and the Muslim World took a similar tack.

And General Brown referred to his receipt of "letters of support of a type I totally reject as alien to America and alien to me".

But backlash logic is not dependent on committed anti-semites, or ideological right-wing anti-semitism - quite the reverse is true - and the concept of dual loyalty is built in. General Brown was just one who let that particular mishapen cat out of the bag.

#### "National Interest"

There can be no disloyalty in supporting Israel; if support of Israel is perceived as clearly in American national interest."

But that perception is becoming blurred. On a formal foreign affairs level, the Library of Congress, in its latest update of the Middle East, lists six basic concerns of America with that region, presumably in order of priority. The fifth of those is America's "long-standing commitment to Israel." Preceding that are matters of oil, geopolitical access to the area, and prevention of Soviet dominance. If Israel is not deemed important to the United States for these other reasons as well, then that isolated, fifth-place "commitment" looms small indeed.

There is general knowledge that the oil-producing nations are not enamoured of Communism, nor of the Soviet Union. Among the knowledgeable, there is little illusion that these nations would simply fall into our lap, if we supported them against Israel; but, as certain State Department experts have repeatedly told us, courting the Arab nations is a way to go in pursuit of American national interest; in pursuit of oil access, and the containment of the Soviet Union. The thread of that

possibility has never been cut by American foreign policy. Nor did the government ever put all of its diplomatic chips on Israel, even when it was necessarily matching arms shipments with the Soviet Union.

And there are less academic definitions of "national interest" which are not listed by the Library of Congress; these are coterminous with the American people's definition of their own domestic self-interest, as it relates to jobs, taxes, comfort and safety. It is this to which Congressman "Pete" McCloskey recently referred in saying: "I'm afraid that if the American Jewish community gets too forceful in its arguments as to the U.S. commitment to Israel... it could create a wave of anti-semitism." A congressional supporter of Israel, McCloskey was suggesting that under certain circumstances the American people would see such pro-Israel "forcefulness" as an act of American Jewish disregard for the current economic plight of their fellow countrymen. That is itself a variant of dual loyalty charge.

The public perception of national interest as wedded to support of Israel seems shakier for yet another reason. It has long been understood that public opinion on "national interest" as applied to foreign affairs is largely shaped by political leadership. For those leadership tendencies "on the right", national interest with respect to Israel has traditionally been related to the Library of Congress list. For those leadership tendencies "on the left", there has presumably been another supportive factor, as described by William R. Polk, who long served as a Middle East expert on the Policy Planning Committee of the State Department:

"The writers who continuously point to the fact that there are practically no American "national interests" in the survival of Israel along lines

presently constituted have a point. They neglect however, two facets of foreign affairs: one is the ideological commitment, however vaguely expressed, of the bulk of the American population for open, democratic societies... Much more real, sustained and influential is the projection of American identification with Israel as a sanctuary for world Jewry. This is an intense and emotionally held commitment on the part of the vast majority of the American Jewish community. However, it quite transcends the American Jewish community in political impact: American Jewry has been able to identify with the cause of Israel the overwhelming bulk of opinion in liberal American politics."

But it is exactly the spine of liberal opinion in American politics which is weakened on the subject of Israel. There are many concrete evidences including the lukewarm and conflicted discussions on the issue at the 1974 Midterm Democratic Convention.

In a recent New York article, on that convention's treatment of Israel, Richard Reeves acknowledges that American strategy might well change to the disadvantage of Israel. He argues that "American strategy" might be different if Jewish-Americans stepped out and raised a little more hell." He thinks that there is still a sentiment that could rise above the narrowly perceived requirements of U.S. national interest. "Most Americans admire the guts of the Israelis and relate to a small democracy surrounded by modern feudalism." But the analyses indicate that such a sentiment does not go very deep, will not stand up under much stress, certainly will not stand up against a change in governmental policy. Reeves himself quotes a labor official and Democratic Party delegate from Alabama, when asked whether his people would support military action to save Israel: "Hell no

I guess we sympathize with Israel - we kind of grew up that way. But nobody talks about it at all down home." And another delegate, a county official from New Jersey said: " They'd like to see Israel survive. But it would be like Hungary and Czechoslovakia - it's really a tragedy, but it happened. So long!"

He also describes how Senators Muskie of Maine and McGee of Wyoming, both traditional friends of Israel, and well aware of how American Jews feel, "were silent as Israel and Jews were ravaged" at the Democratic convention. This erosion of a "favorable edge" towards Israel in liberal leadership circles is particularly notable among younger politicals - often influential assistants to elected officials - and among younger labor and black leaders. This is a generational as well as an ideological phenomenon. Vietnam replaced the Holocaust as the central historical focus around which to fix one's political morality. For a sector of this leadership, America, not Nazi Germany, is the moral villain of the era - and Israel is seen as a handmaiden of America at its worst.

Short of that, there is an increasing tendency to see our national interest in terms of domestic problems, rather than in terms of missions abroad. And this new leadership is therefore vulnerable to the anti-Jewish backlash syndrome, as reflected in their constituencies. According to recent polls, when asked about which groups have "too much influence on American policy in the Middle East," responses negative to American Jews come disproportionately from the very young and from the Blacks, as well as from the least educated and Southerners. These populations are also disproportionately negative to the idea of accepting a Jew as President.

But to understand the full and future implications of this tendency on the ideological left, it is necessary to explore another factor; the vulnerability of the left to its own concept of dual loyalty by the Jews.

#### Dual Loyalty - Right Wing and Left Wing

Historically, the term "dual loyalty" or "divided loyalty" has been associated with militant nationalism. The term flourished in the jingoistic and nativist campaigns before and after World War I.

Teddy Roosevelt denounced divided loyalty as "moral treason". He attacked "German-Americans who call themselves such" while Woodrow Wilson publicly repudiated the "hyphenate vote" as it applied to the Irish. The charge of divided loyalty accompanied the passage of the restrictive immigration laws of the 1920's. It should be noted, however, that the Jews became prime targets of these right-wing attacks on hyphenated Americans, even though they had no native land with which they could divide their loyalties, as did the Germans and the Irish. They were in effect accused of being disloyal to the United States, not on behalf of another country, but on behalf of un-American ideas, and on behalf of an international conclave, e.g.: radicalism and the Elders of Zion.

The charge of "dual loyalty", is after all only one way to concretize impulses towards conformity and ethnic homogeneity, especially in a time of crisis. The bottom issue is not dual loyalty but disloyalty.

The entanglement of political loyalty and ethnic loyalty has its political uses, especially in a time of crisis. Ethnic disloyalty is usually the more powerful quality, blood being thicker than national borders. In the United States, with its peculiar derivation, there early developed the concept of an organic nation rather than an ethnic

nation as the basis of loyalty. But even so there was always the implicit understanding that this organic nation was essentially Anglo-Saxon in nature. This understanding became more explicit in the latter part of the 19th century. Josiah Strong's popular book, Our Country, published in 1885, stressed the political and moral superiority of our Anglo-Saxon national culture; and in so doing, reflected the line of thought among influential American historians such as Herbert Baxter Adams.

The American Protective Association was organized in 1887, developing earlier nativist antagonism towards Catholics, which was really antagonism towards Irish immigrants. The basic complaint was disloyalty. The formal program of the APA called for a defense of "true Americanism" against the "subjects of an un-American ecclesiastical institution." The APA posited a conscious plot "to concentrate Catholic immigration from Europe in large American cities and by its vote to seize them for the Catholic church." A bogus papal encyclical was circulated, absolving American Catholics from any oaths of loyalty to the United States, and instructing them to "exterminate all heretics." In Toledo, the Mayor actually called out the National Guard to protect against such a Catholic take-over.

Then Southern and Eastern European immigrant groups began to flood into America. Their ethnic diversity was sharper, their ethnic cohesiveness more dramatic, and the basis for charges of "disloyalty" was therefore sharper and more dramatic. The nativist successor to the APA, the second KU KLUX Klan, picked up the theme and found the Jews a most suitable target. The Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans, in 1923, told 75 thousand KKKers in Dallas that the Jews are "an absolutely unblendable element." For Jews, he explained, "patriotism as the Anglo-Saxon feels it, is impossible."

That image of Jewish disloyalty had nothing to do with an Israel unborn. It had to do with the "unblendable" nature of the Jews - that is to say, their stubborn loyalty to their own group, and the precedent nature of that loyalty. Such images of ethnic disloyalty have been a standard part of right-wing nativist movements in America. Needless to say, such images did not foment, but were fomented by these extremist movements, themselves created by various historical, social and economic crises in the country. However, for these right-wing extremist movements, and for more respectable politicians pressured by extremism, these images have been politically useful and effective.

The precise term "dual loyalty" with its nativist and nationalistic roots, has never appeared in the liberal or left lexicon. The term would seem to be particular anathema in those circles today, given their current championship of multi-ethnic florescence in America. However, there is a serious contradiction imbedded in liberal and left-wing ideology. On the one hand, there is an apparent dedication to ethnic pluralism. On the other hand, there is a prior and profound impulse towards universalizing the social experience in a way that would radically delimit strong ethnic group loyalties.

The ideal may indeed be a society which combines ethnic permissiveness with egalitarian virtues. But the question is whether, in the doing, the first element is the soft and romantic one; and the second a hard and implacable one. As Michael P. Riccards commented in the first edition of Italian Americana: "It is doubtful, despite all the talk of ethnic re-identity, that this option a vibrant multi-ethnic life is really open to third and fourth generation Americans in our technocratic world. If this is so, then ethnic consciousness is a

partly contrived romantic notion, rather than a genuine search for roots. It reminds one of the court maidens in the eighteenth century who donned shepherd clothes, rode off to the field, and made believe they were returning to nature - at least for one afternoon."

It is further notable in this regard that most of the ethnic programs in this country are in the first instance directed towards "disadvantaged groups", which may well be expected to wither away as groups when they are no longer disadvantaged. In any case, there is a long-standing ideological impulse on the left which is counter-ethnic and on certain grounds of dual loyalty.

That left-wing counter-ethnic impulse has been described by many people in many ways over the years, but nowhere more appropriately for this discussion than by Harold Rosenberg in the pages of this magazine a quarter of a century ago.

He was commenting on Sartre's Anti-Semite and Jew, the best part of which, according to Rosenberg, was "his criticism of the democratic defender of the Jew, for whom all men are essentially alike, and for whom the Jew can belong to human society only to the extent that he suppresses himself as a Jew, and for whom the assertion by Jews of Jewish differences is a sign of stubbornness, backwardness or ill-will. The liberal-scientific concept of the human being, the demands for uniformity that go with it, somehow seemed sounder while plans for a universal society were on the order of the day. We would have been willing to lose ourselves as we were for the sake of the men we might have become. The dream of eliminating all inherited differences among peoples have proven however to be utopian, and not only not possible

but not even desirable."

But Rosenberg pointed out that Sartre's rejection of such utopianism still does not embrace the continuance of the Jew, but only the continuance of the Frenchman:

"For in the end, he too wishes to dissolve the Jewish collective identity into its abstract particles, that is, into men made more human by ceasing to be Jews. He wants the French Jew to become a Frenchman as the democrats do.... After all, the democrat is really not unaware that Jews exist. He simply does not believe that they have to exist as Jews. He believes that by changing their situation, by creating a situation common to all men, the Jews, together with all peoples, will shed their particularities bit by bit. Sartre, like the liberal, anticipates that with social improvement, both the Jew and the anti-semite will be eliminated..."

That liberal-scientific impulse is at fundamental loggerheads not just with the particularities of the Jews, but with any ethnic particularities, when they become more serious than the exercises of eighteenth century court maidens. And at that point, there emerges the critical question of "divided loyalty." Rousseau, one of the earliest ideologues in this vein, explicitly abhorred the allegiance which individuals might hold to intervening groups rather than to the universal state which was dedicated to the liberal-scientific concept. It would be a mistake not to recognize this ideological impulse as one of the factors behind the modern liberal ambiguities of attitude towards Israel and towards American Jewry.

Israel is itself an abomination for those who most consciously cleave to the liberal-scientific concept. They dream of a "democratic, secular"

Israel in which national particularities will probably wither away. And American Jews are a serious non-withering ethnic group, especially in their particularistic support of that Israel.'

David Horowitz, editor of Ramparts, recently wrote a standard article from that vantage point, which explicitly linked the common sin of Israel and of American Jewry: "ethnicization". He wrote that "(F) or the Zionized majority...Jewish identity increasingly is no longer a spiritual but primarily an ethnic identification..." It is typical that this viewpoint, like that of the American Council for Judaism, makes much of emphasizing the religious-only (Protestant-like, non-ethnic) nature of Jewishness. But at the same time, this viewpoint about the religious nature of Judaism, and mainly approves of that religious nature when it is seen as a secular and universal social philosophy. Thus, the Jewish religion for Horowitz in his article is equated with the "prophetic tradition", which happens to coincide with his current political beliefs. Of all Jews, he writes most approvingly of "Marx and other Jewish revolutionaries and 'idealists' who secularized the prophetic tradition of Israel in a program of social revolution."

Although Horowitz complains about much specific Israeli behavior - including some that deserves complaint - he is finally complaining about the idea of the nation itself, referring to "the betrayal of Judaic teachings implied by Jewish nationalism..." And when he makes complaints about the American Jewish community - which deserves much complaint - he really ends up complaining about the idea of the Jew, the ethnic Jew, the collective Jew. He quotes Isaac Deutscher as to the definition of the Jew: "Religion? I am an atheist. Jewish nationalism. I am an internationalist. In neither sense am I, therefore a Jew. I am, however,

a Jew by force of my unconditional solidarity with the persecuted and the oppressed." That is the only imperative for the Jew (and for everybody else alike).

The theme of Horowitz' charge against the Jews is that of divided loyalty. In his terms, instead of allegiance to the liberal-scientific goals, which he peculiarly sees imbedded in the prophetic tradition, the Jews prefer to stick together too much. (According to the polls, a majority of Americans believe that "Jews stick together too much.") They are hyphenate universals.

It is more than curious how this same basic hostile formulation has emerged from both the left and right sides of the hall. Then Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and Africa, Henry Byroade, made a public speech in 1954 in which he told the Israelis that "you should come to truly look upon yourselves as a Middle Eastern State and see your future in that context, rather than as a headquarters or nucleus, so to speak, of world-wide groupings of peoples of a particular religious faith..."

There were shades of a proposal for a "democratic secular state." And Byroade addressed his rebukes not only to the Israelis, but also to American Jewry. Shortly thereafter, he was the keynote speaker at the annual meeting of the American Council for Judaism - the organization which featured the so-called problem of dual loyalty.

#### Israel and Dual Loyalty

It is an irony of Jewish proportions that Israel now concretizes the charge of dual loyalty against American Jews, for both the left and right. France has been the ideological mother-bed of this syndrome relative to

Jewish loyalty. Clermont-Tonnere, the liberal champion of Jewish liberty at the time of the French Revolution, ended his famous speech demanding freedom for the Jews by insisting that "in France there can be only Frenchmen" - suggesting that if the Jews were going to be less than that, they should leave. Edouard Drumont reflected this continuing sentiment, from another vantage point, when he wrote *La France Juive* in 1886, indicating that the allegiance of the Jews was only to themselves, and they would be perpetual aliens in France. Jewish treason was the point of the Dreyfus Affair a few years later. And sitting at the trial of Dreyfuss was Theodore Herzl as a news correspondent who then became convinced that charges of disloyalty against the Jews would disappear only when they had their own land.

From the outset of Zionism, of course, there have been those who worried that new charges of disloyalty would become possible. At the close of the first Zionist Congress, in 1897, Rabbi Isaac M. Wise said: "We cannot afford to let it go out into the world that we are in sympathy with a cause which we know will ultimately result in harm to the Jews even in this country...we denounce the whole question of a Jewish State as foreign to the spirit of the modern Jew of this land..."

This was an internal Jewish debate which was largely rendered moot by Hitler, but lingered for a decade or so after the creation of Israel. Perhaps the most outspoken ideologue of this concern in those years' <sup>non-Jewish</sup> was Dorothy Thompson, who is to be remembered as one of the early and most vigorous anti-Nazi journalists of America. Here was a universalistic concept of America. In a 1950 article entitled "America Demands a Single Loyalty," she wrote: "There are no minorities in the United States." She quoted Woodrow Wilson: "You cannot become true Americans if you think

of yourselves in groups. America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America hasnot yet become American."

Dorothy Thompson made no distinction between political nationality and ethnic nationality. She was still talking, in 1915 Wilsonian terms, about political "hyphenates". She did not recognize that the fundamental charge of dual loyalty against Jews had little to do with a given political state. She did not consider the compatibility of ethnic loyalty and political loyalty, dual loyalties indeed. As a matter of fact, her discussions did not include the concept of serious ethnic groupings at all.

Since that time, there has developed a greater consciousness of the ethnic group concept, whatever its practical outcome in this country - and new working definitions of ethnicity. A U.S. Senate document now says that "ethnic groups would mean ethnic nationality, cultural, historical, racial groups, or groups whose members define themselves as a people claiming historical peoplehood." And, since the 1950s, the discussion of dual loyalty has dwindled away as an internal debate in the Jewish community. Since the threatening 1967 war, in particular, the consensual American Jew has accepted as a matter of course, a responsibility to Israel for survival support which cut across old philosophical differences. Also, in 1967, and heightened in 1973, there developed a closer link between the United States and Israel than there had ever been before. Their interests seemed at one.

There was more discussion of this issue in Jewish circles, over-stimulated by statements of some Israeli leaders, than in the general community. The professional anti-semites used it, with little effect, and seemed to

prefer their more encompassing charges of dual loyalty. The issue of dual loyalty vis-a-vis Israel had little relevance for most Americans until recently. The nature of America's entanglement with Israel is new. The economic condition of America is new, as is its entanglement with Middle Eastern oil. And now, with irreparable shrinkage in the special historical attachment of the liberal political leadership to Israel, the naked question of national interest, domestic and diplomatic, will shape the nature of any Israel-connected backlash against American Jews with its imputations of dual loyalty. Such a backlash is in the wings, if the objective circumstances should ever arise, and it would come from the left, the right, and the general populace. That is the significance of General Brown's remarks and those of Congressman McCloskey.

#### The Meaning of Dual Loyalty

The standard right wing charge of divided loyalty against the Jews preceded the establishment of Israel. They were accused of disloyalty to America despite their other-statelessness. They were accused of supra-national allegiance to an ideology because of tribalism. Now, from left-wing sources, they are being accused of disloyalty out of supra-ideological allegiance to a nation because of tribalism.

The Soviet Union managed to combine both of these variants. Its attack on the "cosmopolitan" Jew as in part historically continuous with that scientific-liberal European tradition striving "to dissolve the Jewish collective identity." And, in part, it was a reactionary right-wing attack on a group which was seen to have alien, supra-national loyalties. That was all before Israel.

Israel has been able to bring out in bas-relief the conjoining antipathies to Jewish existence of both left wing and right wing pathology. But

cosmopolitanism has always been the charge that lay behind the Jewish "troubles".

It was in 1889 that Joseph Jacobs wrote: "...the Jew stands up for differentiation in character. It is not his ideal that all men should be alike...and in the practical expression of that aim; he lives and dies. This is the much abused separateness of the Israelites which brings down upon him the ill-will of nearly the whole world...The interesting point to observe is what (these criticisms) object to in the Jewish character is not its too great narrowness but its cosmopolitanism."

Jews have actively, voluntarily and stubbornly differed from their neighbors longer, in more places and more dramatically than any other historical group. Difference is the metaphor of the historical Jew. And Jew is the historical metaphor for the principle of difference. No small principle intimately related to the general principle of political freedom, it continues to be tested in a variety of circumstances; wherever the Jews are the fulcrum of that rest, they will be open to one charge or another of disloyalty. And whenever societies are in certain kinds of trouble, they will be tempted to place Jews at the fulcrum, because of the metaphorical significance of the Jews. That is the simple, central fact about modern anti-semitism.

It therefore makes sense to see this problem possibly facing American Jewry with respect to Israel, (and that facing Israel itself), not as something new; not a problem created by Zionism, as Dorothy Thompson saw it; but as a culmination of an old, continuing problem. This situation - and many people are struggling to say it in many eloquent ways - is an ultimate "test" of the world, and of the American society. Israel, in

pursuit of its survival - survival as Israel - presents an old metaphorical test to the world. And American Jewry, in pursuit of its own survival, as Jewry, which includes its responsibility to Jewish history and peoples, presents American society with yet another metaphorical test. The measure of that discrete test is whether adverse objective circumstances relating to America and Israel, even with full expression of ethnic loyalties by American Jews, will create what Pete McCloskey calls "a wave of anti-semitism" in America, around the issue of "dual loyalty".

For, it should be made clear, American Jews will not be in the position of German Americans or Italian Americans or Japanese Americans at the times when this country was fighting a war against those countries of origin. The United States will not be at war with Israel. American Jews may, at worst, be rather closer to the position of the Jewish Americans of the 1930s at times when the American government was doing less than it could have to save European Jews, or even standing in the way of such salvation. During that period, American Jewish sentiments also ran strongly counter to American public opinion. In 1938, three quarters of the American people said that we should not allow a larger number of Jewish exiles from Germany to come to the United States. In 1939, two thirds of the American people opposed the proposal that the government permit ten thousand refugee children from Germany to come to this country to be taken care of in American homes. There were objective conditions then too, including economic conditions and a general isolationist temper, which helped to shape that American public opinion. The bite would be even closer to the bone now. Much more is needed from America than simple refuge. Out of an urgency shaped frankly by their

ethnic experience and loyalty, American Jews would react vigorously against any adverse governmental policy or public opinion. Different segments of American Jewry would undoubtedly react with different perceptions, themes, and calibres of wisdom - but in toto, they would react audibly, in the legitimate framework of American political dissent. Under the circumstances postulated, an anti-Jewish backlash would not be created by Jewish public expression, but could certainly be exacerbated by it.

It would be surprising if some variation of the contretemps described above did not eventuate - earlier or later. And, under those circumstances, it would be surprising if some measure of anti-Jewish backlash did not appear. The constant response of about 30 per cent of Americans that "Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America" is no more innocent than it seems. As has been indicated, the question of Jewish "loyalty" in general is at the heart of the age old antipathy towards stubborn Jewish difference. In one factor analysis of a dozen conventional anti-semitic beliefs, it was found that the "loyalty of Israel" question had the highest loading of relationship to the other items. Even when the much milder and different question is asked about whether the Jews and other ethnic groups have "quite close" ties to countries of reference, most people see the close ties of Jews to Israel as "bad for the United States" than see the close ties of the Irish to Ireland, or any other ethnic group's close ties to its country of origin as "bad for the United States." In Pre-World War II polls, about 30 per cent of Americans thought that Jews "were less patriotic than other citizens." And even during the war against the Nazis, a similar number believed that the Jews were "less willing than other Americans" to serve their country.

In other words, there is evidence of a substantial field of vulnerability among the American people with respect to charges of dual loyalty. Israel or no, which could be excited by issues relating to Israel. But those statistics do not make a pogrom. To begin with, the issues which might activate these attitudes have not been foolishly perceived by the American people. With respect to our current economic difficulties, about five Americans blame Arabs, and about twelve Americans blame big business for every one that blames the Jews. And almost three times as many Americans feel that the oil companies have an undue influence on American policy in the Middle East, as feel that way about Jews. This comes under the heading of the old joke about the patient in a psychiatric hospital whose tag line is: "I may be crazy, but I'm not stupid." There is a strong problem-solving non-expressive bias in popular American political thought.

Related is another countervailing factor: the overall resistance of the American people and of American institutions to extremist movements. A multitude of antipathetic attitudes towards Jews can lie around, as they have, and even grow and become somewhat more troublesome, without erupting into politically dangerous Nazi-like phenomena. There is not now even the sign of a hand on the horizon with respect to such an organized anti-semitic movement. It should be noted that during the chaotic days of the 1960s when blacks were marching, rioting and gaining jobs; and when students were rioting and bombs were going off with regularity - backlash emotions were high, but the expected organized backlash never developed. What did develop was a kind of "closet fascism" which significantly never dared to come out of the closet, and which ended in the Nixon debacle, to the overwhelming applause of the American people.

That element of democratic constraint in American life carries no warranty and is scarcely to be guaranteed against all possible conditions. But it is clearly a factor in mitigation of the "thirty per cent." Oppressive anti-semitism is not going to "sweep the country", no matter what the census of anti-semites, until and unless there develops some political and organizational apparatus which is not yet in sight.

But the "test" is more sophisticated than that, this time around. An awesome juxtaposition of American Jews, America and Israel is developing at this climactic moment of history. It has the effect of revealing the real nature of and refreshing the age-old charge of dual loyalty against Jews as a kind of pressure for conformity, from whatever political or ideological pole. It would not be necessary for democratic constraints to break down fascistially and precipitously in order for life to become increasingly uncomfortable for the American Jew - who exactly as we say about the Soviet Jew - wants to fully identify as a Jew.